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ABSTRACT 
 
UNDERSTANDING SUCCESS IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION: COMPARING 
RUSSIAN AND TURKISH MEDIATION ATTEMPTS IN THE NAGORNO-
KARABAKH CONFLICT 
 
MERT ÖZ 
 
M.A. Thesis, May 2018 
 
Supervisor: Prof Bülent Aras 
 
Keywords: International Mediation, Two-Pillars, Success, Bias, Leverage, the Nagorno-
Karabakh Conflict, Russia, Turkey 
International mediation has been used extensively to manage international conflicts. The 
literature on international mediation has focused extensively on success of mediation and 
how and why international mediation offers are accepted by conflicting parties. This thesis 
aims to dwell on both discussions by developing a two-pillar approach to success in 
international mediation. The thesis argues that the first pillar of mediation is the acceptance 
of mediation offers, related to the characteristics of mediators, and the second pillar of 
mediation is either the reduction in conflict behaviour or the achievement of national goals 
of mediators. This is because the thesis sees mediation not only as a conflict resolution 
method but also as a foreign policy tool. Since these two approaches will require different 
outcomes in the evaluation of the post-mediation environment but both of them require the 
fulfilment of the first pillar of mediation success, the focus of this thesis is on the first pillar. 
While revealing this, the thesis argues that the more resources a mediator has, the more likely 
its mediation offers will be accepted. In this line, the thesis rests specifically on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, as both approaches to mediation can be observed in that conflict, and 
compares the mediation attempts of Russia and Turkey with a focus on their leverages. In 
addition to this theoretical objective, the thesis also aims to put forth some recommendations 
for Turkey to increase its likelihood of success in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
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ÖZET 
 
ULUSLARARASI ARABULUCULUKTA BAŞARIYI ANLAMAK: RUSYA VE 
TÜRKİYE’NİN DAĞLIK-KARABAĞ SORUNUNA YÖNELİK ARABULUCULUK 
GİRİŞİMLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI 
 
MERT ÖZ  
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Mayıs 2018 
 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Bülent Aras 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Arabuluculuk, Çift Katman, Başarı, Taraflılık, Baskı Gücü, 
Dağlık-Karabağ Sorunu, Rusya, Türkiye 
Uluslararası arabuluculuk uluslararası çatışmaları çözmek noktasında oldukça fazla 
kullanılmıştır. Arabuluculuk literatüründe en çok tartışılan konulardan ikisi arabuluculuk 
faaliyetlerinde başarı ve çatışan tarafların nasıl ve niçin arabuluculuk tekliflerini kabul ettiği 
olmuştur. Bu tez, bu iki tartışmaya da uluslararası arabuluculukta başarı üzerine çift katmanlı 
bir yaklaşım geliştirerek değinmektedir. Bu tez ilk katmanın arabuluculuk teklifinin 
arabulucuların özelliklerine bağlı olarak kabul edilmesi, ve ikinci katmanınsa ya çatışma 
davranışlarında azalma ya da arabulucuların milli hedeflerinin gerçekleştirilmesi olduğunu 
savunmaktadır. Bunun sebebi bu tezin arabuluculuğu sadece çatışma çözümü yöntemi olarak 
değil, aynı zamanda bir dış politika aracı olarak görmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu iki 
yaklaşım arabuluculuk sonrası durumun değerlendirilmesinde farklı sonuçlara gereksinim 
duyacağı ama her iki yaklaşımda da ilk katmanın başarılı olması gerektiği için, bu tezdeki 
odak noktası ilk katmandır. Bunu gösterirken bu tez daha fazla güce sahip olan arabulucuların 
arabuluculuk tekliflerinin daha fazla kabul edileceğini savunmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda bu tez 
arabuluculuğa dair bu iki yaklaşımın gözlemlenebilmesinden ötürü özel olarak Dağlık-
Karabağ sorununa odaklanmakta ve sahip oldukları güçlerin odağında Rusya ve Türkiye’nin 
arabuluculuk faaliyetlerini karşılaştırmaktadır. Bu teorik hedefe ek olarak da bu tez aynı 
zamanda Türkiye’ye yönelik Türkiye’nin Dağlık-Karabağ sorununda arabuluculuk başarısını 
artırabilecek önerilerde bulunmaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflicts are prevalent, and they constitute an integral feature of human societies, no 
matter where they live. They stem, at a basic level, from the perceived incompatibility of 
needs, interests, goals of human groups, and ‘may entail a variety of criteria and meanings 
from political quarrels and struggles, economic differences, large-scale wars with fatality 
criteria, to small wars and skirmishes’ (Bercovitch and Fretter, 2007, p. 153). Just like 
conflicts, the attempts to manage conflicts are as common and diversified some of the most-
known types of which are facilitation, negotiation, peacekeeping, problem-solving 
workshops, arbitration, adjudication and mediation. Mediation, as a ‘chosen strategy’ 
(Mitchell, 1998, p. 48), is going to be the focus of this thesis. This is the case due to two 
reasons.  
The first reason is that as a conflict management method, reflecting a strategy, 
mediation has been one of the most practiced methods. It is utilised at both domestic and 
international levels to manage conflicts, mostly ‘in the later phases of a conflict’ and in line 
with other conflict management methods (Bercovitch and Fretter, 2007, p. 159). This 
approach to mediation, seeing it as a method of conflict resolution, is the first approach that 
is used when discussing mediation.  
Mediation is also seen as a foreign policy tool (Touval, 2003), which constitutes the 
second reason why studying mediation is crucial because although mediation is at its core a 
conflict resolution mechanism, it is also utilised by states to meet their goals in addition to 
and/or at the expense of the resolution of the conflict. As the author of this thesis, I am of 
belief that both approaches are valid, and they should be incorporated. As a result, this thesis 
assumes that mediation both as a conflict resolution method and as a foreign policy tool used 
to meet national interests constitute the pillars of international mediation.  
Hence, when a discussion on mediation success, which is an important aspect of the 
scholarship on international mediation and one of the ultimate goals of this thesis, is held, 
both approaches to mediation should be kept in mind because how to measure success will 
be different in both cases, which will be analysed in detail at a later stage of this thesis. Since 
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the aim of this thesis is to understand success in international mediation with a particular 
focus on the two-dimensionality of the utilisation of mediation, this thesis will be specifically 
about understanding success in international mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as 
the conflict provides a concrete case study where success in international mediation can be 
understood where two approaches to mediation do exist. 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has witnessed continuous Russian mediation 
(for the manipulation of the conflict) and a continuous interest of Turkey to mediate the 
conflict (for the resolution of the conflict), is a telling case when we aim to understand 
mediation success. Since in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, no positive post-mediation 
environment, the one discussed by Bercovitch and Houston (1996), because Russia, the main 
mediator of the conflict has been using mediation as a foreign policy tool to control Armenia 
and Azerbaijan and the conflict is still protracted (no resolution), and Turkey, with intentions 
to resolve the conflict, has not been accepted as a mediator to the conflict so far, this thesis, 
while analysing success in international mediation, will focus on the first pillar of mediation 
success which is the acceptance of mediation offers/acceptability of mediators -determined 
by the degree of resourcefulness of mediators (see below), as this constitutes a point of 
discussion for both Russian and Turkish mediation. Due to its insights into both 
understanding mediation success and the role of resources in determining mediation success 
instead of concerns of neutrality, bias and impartiality, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is 
quite crucial to analyse. 
Although the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh can be traced back to centuries ago, the 
conflict in its current form started in 1988 in what was then the Soviet Union. Following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the conflict turned into a bloody international war pitting 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis against each other. The 1994 mediation of the conflict, initiated 
by Russia, ceased the conflict, managing it but not resolving it. Following this initial 
mediation, the so-called Minsk Group, with the co-chairmanship of Russia, the US, and 
France, under the auspices of the OSCE, was formed to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.  
This development has an important implication for the study of international mediation 
and created an impetus for this thesis. As we shall see in a detailed manner in the next chapter 
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on the theoretical discussions about international mediation, the notions of bias, neutrality 
and impartiality occupy a significant place in discussions on the characteristics of mediators 
as determinants of the likelihood of mediation success, especially the first pillar of mediation 
success defined as defined as the acceptance of mediation offers in this thesis (see below). 
Many, mostly those who support pure mediation, argue that mediation offers will more likely 
be accepted when both disputants see the mediator as an unbiased, neutral and impartial actor. 
However, given the current international system, this is such an unrealistic expectation that 
it should be scrutinised. This is because both the working of the international system and the 
national interests of states make it extremely difficult to have a totally unbiased, neutral and 
impartial mediator. Therefore, many scholars, mostly those whose who support power 
mediation, stress the importance of resources (or power/leverages1) that a mediator possesses 
as the determinant of the acceptance (success) and/or rejection (failure) of mediation. When 
we examine composition of the Minsk Group, and specifically Russia, this situation becomes 
clearer.   
Although the US is trying to follow a balanced policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
the direction of support from Russia and France favours Armenia over Azerbaijan (Hirose 
and Jasutis, 2014, p. 13). This is mostly because there are strong Armenian diasporas in these 
three states lobbying for support in Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (de Waal, 
2010a, p. 173). This situation diminishes the balance in American policies towards the 
conflict as well, which Azerbaijan has continuously criticised. Nevertheless, despite this 
apparent bias, the mediation of these three states, under the Minsk Group and through 
Russia’s single-handed mediation, have so far been accepted by both disputants. This has 
been the case especially with Russian mediation.  
Russia has dominated the mediation process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the 
extent that other players play either a minimal role (like France and the US) or nearly no role 
at all (like Turkey). That Turkish mediation attempts have not been accepted by both 
disputants at the same time and Turkey’s interest in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict has remained as an interest falling short of being realised deserve a detailed analysis 
                                                          
1 In this thesis, the terms “resource”, “power” and “leverage” are used interchangeably. 
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that should say more than that Turkey's apparent bias in the conflict hinders any prospect of 
Turkey being accepted as a mediator, the first pillar of success in international mediation. 
This is because when we examine our case, as we shall see in the rest of this study, 
even though its mediation proposals have so far been accepted by both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, Russia is a biased, unneutral and partial actor in the conflict, favouring Armenia. 
Therefore, claims revolving around the idea that since Turkey is positively biased towards 
Azerbaijan, its mediation will not be accepted by both Armenia and Azerbaijan are not 
logical. This, to a great extent, stems from the fact that as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is 
an inter-ethnic, inter-cultural and international protracted conflict, just like similar conflicts, 
it requires a more ‘manipulative’, or more powerful as used in this thesis, mediation as such 
a mediation will include a certain level of coerciveness, a resource that will be discussed in 
full detail later in this chapter, required in the mediation of protracted and intercultural 
conflicts (see Salmon et al., 2013) instead of being totally unbiased, neutral and impartial. 
Hence, the logical argument to understand Russia’s mediation success and Turkey’s 
mediation failure should be based on another criterion: resources. Although Russia and 
Turkey are similar in terms of bias, neutrality and impartiality, when we examine Russia and 
Turkey with a focus on resources (leverages), we have a totally different picture. As a result, 
evaluating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, taking into account the characteristics of Russia 
and Turkey as mediators with a focus on the role of resources, is quite telling as it helps 
answer the research question that created the impetus for this thesis: how do resources 
influence the likelihood of acceptance of mediation offers of states towards protracted 
international conflicts?  Therefore, in this thesis, based on the focus on the role of leverages 
in the acceptance of mediation offers, the fist pillar of mediation success, the author will 
compare Russian and Turkish mediation attempts in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to 
develop a pattern of understanding for mediation success, and to come up with several 
suggestions to turn what is just an interest of Turkey to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict into a realised objective of Turkish foreign policy. 
As the main aim of this thesis is to understand the factors of success in international 
mediation, what success means should be stated in advance. In this thesis, mediation success 
is seen as a two-pillar phenomenon. The first one is the acceptance of mediation offers in line 
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with the definition of mediation success proposed by Frei (1976) and the second pillar is the 
post-mediation conflict environment determined by the resolution or continuation of the 
conflict as discussed by Bercovitch and Houston (1996) (see the details in the following 
chapter). When discussing mediation success, the focus of this thesis will be on the 
acceptance of mediation offers, the first pillar of mediation success2, stemming from the 
definition of Frei (1976). Although his definition is about mediation success as a whole, in 
this thesis, the definition will be used to understand the acceptance of mediation success, a 
part of mediation success. 
Frei (1976), while conceptualising his definition of mediation success, suggests that 
there are five important criteria to take into account which are ‘the identity and characteristic 
of the parties, the interrelations among the parties, the characteristics of the conflict, the 
identity and characteristic of the mediator, and the relationship between the mediator and the 
parties’ (as cited in Fisher, 1995, p. 44). The first three criteria are constant no matter who 
the mediator, and therefore, they do not say much for understanding why and how mediation 
offers are accepted by disputants. However, the last two criteria, which are intertwined, are 
crucial to analyse. The last two criteria will constitute the backbone of the approach to the 
first pillar of success in this thesis because they are strictly related to the main argument that 
will be tested in this study. As the author of this thesis argues that rather than being highly 
unbiased, neutral and impartial, the most important characteristic of a mediator (Frei’s fourth 
criterion) that determines mediation success is the availability and making use of resources, 
the main argument developed here is ‘the more resourceful a mediator is, the more likely its 
mediation efforts will be accepted/successful in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’. 
While testing this main argument, that is the leverages of mediators, the author will 
rely on the ‘six bases of power’ concept of Rubin (1992) which include ‘reward power, 
coercive power, expert power, legitimate power, referent power, and informational power’ 
as resource (power/leverage) categories while comparing the characteristics of Russia and 
Turkey as mediators and combine this concept with the ideas of Frei (1976). And to find out 
about the characteristics of the mediators, Russia and Turkey, the relations between the 
                                                          
2 Throughout the thesis, the term mediation success will refer to the first pillar of mediation success, the 
acceptance of mediation offers, unless otherwise stated and specified. 
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disputants and the mediator (Frei’s fifth criterion) will be examined because they tell a lot 
about the characteristics of the mediator (Frei’s fourth criterion). For the same aim, although 
the third criterion of Frei (1976), the character of the conflict, is constant for each mediator, 
since it will reveal important insights into the characteristics of the mediators, this criterion 
will be briefly discussed in the form of the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
In what follows, the author will touch upon (1) the theoretical discussions in the field 
of mediation in general and international mediation specifically, where the concepts used in 
this thesis will be examined in detail, (2) the history of the conflict to better comprehend the 
historical aspect of the interrelated web of relations of Turkey and Russia with the conflicting 
parties, and (3) the relations of Russia and Turkey with the conflicting parties separately. 
Based on the data gathered from these four chapters, the author will initiate a discussion in 
which the aforementioned six categories of power proposed by Rubin, in conjunction with 
the fourth and fifth criteria of Frei (1976), constituting the first pillar of mediation success, 
will be evaluated to test the main argument of this study. The general findings of the thesis 
will then be put forth in the conclusion chapter which will also include sections dedicated to 
policy recommendations, a critique of the ‘six bases of power’ concept of Rubin to discuss 
its merits in international mediation, weaknesses of this thesis, and potential suggestions for 
future studies on international mediation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION: MAJOR ISSUES 
 
2.1. Defining Mediation 
In the literature, there is a plethora of definitions pertaining to mediation, as a conflict 
resolution method, underlining its characteristics and scope with different aspects of it being 
the focal point. One of the very first definitions ever made for mediation was that of Doob 
who saw mediation as the attempts to influence disputing people when there is an issue that 
needs to be dealt with (1993, p. 1 as cited in Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, p. 13). The 
problem with this definition is that it dwells on a highly broad and vague ground skipping 
important details of the characteristics of mediation as a distinct practice. 
Some scholars tend to view mediation to be not distinct from negotiation. For instance, 
Stephens, one of those scholars, argues that the only difference between mediation and 
negotiation is the coming into picture of a third party to help disputants reach a solution 
(1988, p. 52). Nevertheless, this definition falls short of grabbing the fundamental aspects of 
mediation that distinguish itself from other third-party initiatives because of its over-
simplification. 
To develop a more comprehensive definition of mediation, Moore categorises 
mediation as a third-party intervention method where the intervener who possesses neutrality 
and impartiality and lacks compelling authority over the disputants helps the conflicting sides 
conclude an agreement satisfying the needs of both sides (1986, p. 14 as cited in Kolb and 
Babbitt, 1995, p. 64). Though this definition is comprehensive, it suffers from a certain 
weakness that can be observed in the initial definitions suggested by some scholars interested 
in the field: extensive reliance on the neutrality and impartiality of mediators as prerequisites. 
As we will discuss at a later stage in this chapter, the notions of neutrality and impartiality 
should not be as valued as such definitions do due to the changes in the context in which 
international mediation takes place. 
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In this thesis, to avoid the shortcomings of the abovementioned definitions and other similar 
definitions which were not dealt with specifically here, the author will refer to the proposed 
definition of Bercovitch. For Bercovitch, mediation is;  
   ‘a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own 
efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance of, 
or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organisation to 
change, affect or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without resorting to 
physical force or invoking the authority of law’ (1992, p. 7).  
This definition will be used in this thesis because it (1) is, to the date, the most 
comprehensive yet cohesive definition ever proposed, (2) captures the voluntary, non-violent, 
non-binding and reciprocal features of the act of mediation, (3) avoids relying on neutrality 
and impartiality which are constantly and unnecessarily portrayed as prerequisites for a 
mediator, (4) points out to the fact that mediation is more appropriate for conflict 
management than resolution, and (5) illustrates who can serve as mediators.  
An important notice, which will be clarified and detailed in the following sections of 
this chapter, should also be made here. The idea that mediation is a non-coercive process 
does mean that mediators cannot rely on the direct usage of their physical force. However, it 
does not imply that mediators lack and cannot use resources, including the implications of 
their military might, available to them (see Kolb and Babbitt, 1995) because they can make 
use of the implications of their physical force. In other words, although mediators cannot 
forcefully compel the disputants to agree to a specific term as stressed in the definition to be 
used in this chapter, they can utilise their resources to change the mindset of the disputants 
to move them towards agreement. However, it is still up to the disputants to accept or decline 
a specific agreement because even a mediator’s leverage depends on the acceptance by 
disputants (Zartman, 2008a, p. 167). It should also be noted that this definition tilts more 
towards international mediation than domestic mediation, a distinction we will dive into in 
the next section to better understand the two phenomena and conceptualise the need for 
mediation at the international level, which is related to the subject dealt with in this thesis. 
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2.2. Positioning Mediation as a Practice in Domestic and International Arenas 
Mediation has so far been conducted both at the domestic and international arenas, 
albeit under obviously different circumstances. These differences stem from the fact that the 
prevailing structures in both arenas are utterly contradictory.  
When it comes to the domestic level, what we observe is a highly hierarchical order 
consolidated by state-controlled security and legal forces. Such a system provides disputants 
with opportunities of binding conflict resolution tools through judicial means. Although 
individuals can attempt to manage their own conflicts without resorting to legal options, a 
binding solution is available should their individual efforts fail to produce any positive 
results. With an allegoric language, as Kolb and Babbitt underline, at the domestic level 
mediation is the side dish whereas the binding options offered by the legal system are the 
main dishes (1995, p. 76). What can be inferred from this situation is that mediation is an 
alternative for the disputants should they prefer avoiding a legal verdict.  
In the international arena, nevertheless, the structural circumstances are totally 
reversed: no hierarchy exists, and no enforcement mechanisms, legal or police, can be found. 
This is what Hedley Bull (1995) once famously referred to as the ‘anarchical international 
system’. Therefore, when a conflict arises at the international level, there will not be any 
automatic mechanism to deal with the conflict in question in a legal and binding manner. 
Even the binding conflict resolution mechanisms like arbitration and adjudication are at the 
mercy of states, which can opt out of such procedures. What is left for managing conflicts in 
such a setting is either a total military victory for one of the conflicting parties, negotiating a 
solution, or a third-party initiative. Since achieving total military victory is a rare 
accomplishment in the current international system and conflicts negatively affect the 
relations between disputants hindering negotiations, third-party initiatives are more likely to 
be a viable option to disentangle conflicting parties and usher in a more peaceful environment 
and relationship between the former contestants. 
The problem that we need to shed light on here is that this ‘anarchical’ system is 
comprised of independent states which value their survival, territorial integrity, national 
interests and most importantly sovereignty more than anything else. Any third party believed 
to violate sovereignty of another state through a direct and coercive intervention without the 
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consent of the recipient will be condemned, rejected, and fought against if necessary. 
Therefore, we can easily claim that any third-party initiative should consider the realities of 
the international system and respect the needs, interests and values of individual states.  
Given that mediation, as discussed in the section dedicated to its definition above, is 
fundamentally voluntary, non-binding and non-coercive (free of direct physical force), it suits 
well not only the current international system but also the demands of independent and 
sovereign states (Bercovitch, 1991, p. 4; Bercovitch, 1996, p. 2; Bercovitch and Houston, 
1996, p. 12-13; Bercovitch and Fretter, 2007, p. 146; Vukovic, 2011, p. 113). This takes us 
to our next, related subject: the initiation and acceptance of international mediation. In other 
words, it is time to start dealing with the why and how of international mediation. 
 
2.3. The Why and How of International Mediation 
Mediation is merely an option from a wide array of options. In line with this argument, 
Zartman and Touval view ‘mediation as a foreign policy instrument’ (1996, p. 446; also see 
Rubin, 1992, p. 249). This is the case both for the mediator and the mediated. So, when a 
third-party is encouraging disputing parties to accept its mediation services, it is generally a 
reflection of the wider policy decisions of that third-party vis-à-vis the conflicting parties or 
the environment where the conflict in question takes place. Hence, it is a very accurate point 
of view when Mitchell puts forth that mediation should be regarded as ‘a chosen strategy or 
response’ that will be implemented when a third party concludes that the gains from the 
implementation of it will be more than the losses (1988, p. 48) (stress original). Why then do 
third-parties choose the strategy of mediation and conflicting parties choose the strategy of 
accepting mediation offers? Let us first discuss the first half of this question. 
Firstly, states may opt for offering mediation out of altruistic reasons suggesting that 
they are advocates of peace desiring to help manage as many conflicts as possible. 
Nonetheless, the author of this thesis is of the belief that mediation entails possible gains and 
can never stem fully from altruistic considerations (Bercovitch, 1996, p. 9). Even 
Switzerland, famous for being a ‘neutral’ state and mediating conflicts all over the globe, 
cannot be thought of as totally altruistic because even if Switzerland is mediating conflicts 
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out of hopes of managing them peacefully, it is doing so to cement its name as a natural 
mediator, a prestige-oriented goal, or gain. As Mitchell stresses, while offering its mediation 
services, every third party imaginable will have certain objectives to realise apart from 
settling the conflict itself peacefully (1988, p. 31). 
One of these motivations is that states may decide to mediate out of fears that the 
conflict may endanger their own national interests (Bercovitch, 2011, p. 20). This is also 
called a ‘defensive goal’ (Zartman, 2008a, p. 156; Zartman and Touval, 1996, p. 446). 
Another reason why states may be willing to mediate is that they may feel obliged to protect 
the unity of an international organisation to which they are a party, which explains the 
rationale behind the mediation efforts of the US in the Greek-Turkish dispute since all three 
countries are valuable members of NATO (Bercovitch, 2011, p. 21). Yet another interest of 
third-parties in offering mediation may be related to their ‘offensive goals’ (Zartman, 2008a., 
p. 156; Zartman and Touval, 1996, p. 446). The idea behind this ‘offensiveness’ is that third-
parties may consider mediation as a tool to extend their influence over the conflicting parties, 
the region the conflict in question takes place in, and/or gain something out of the resolution 
of the conflict (Bercovitch, 2011, p. 74). 
This list should not be thought as mutually exclusive because all these basic 
motivations can be intertwined at times just as they can constitute the rationale behind 
initiating a mediation offer separately. Moreover, it should be noted that further motivations 
can be identified; however, for efficiency, the author in this thesis will rely on these four 
types of motivations for mediation. In short, along with the peaceful considerations that states 
might possess, as Bercovitch points out when mediation takes place, the third party offering 
it to the disputants will not only attempt to alter the conflict positively either ‘passively or 
assertively’, but it will also try to realise and/or secure its interests (1996, p. 4). 
Just as offering mediation is a choice, so is accepting it. Like third-parties offering 
mediation, conflicting parties have compelling reasons for accepting a mediation offer or ask 
for mediation on their own, with the latter being less common. Conflicting parties may 
proceed with the strategy of accepting a mediation offer because it may be the best possible 
policy alternative available to them in their situation. When conflicting parties calculate the 
costs of accepting or rejecting mediation, the result of the calculation determines the policy 
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that they will embrace.  Stephens illustrates that mediation is preferred provided the 
disputants realise that it will be more harmful for them to reject a mediation offer than to 
accept it (1988, p. 58). This situation clearly demonstrates both the reciprocal and political 
natures of the process of mediation as encapsulated by the definition accepted in this thesis. 
There are other possible explanations behind the acceptance of a mediation offer. 
As I have outlined earlier in this chapter, it is not easy to emerge totally victorious in 
any conflict. When conflicting parties get stuck, they need an acceptable outsider to intervene 
and change the course of the conflict for the better. The point at which conflicting parties 
become stuck is referred to as the ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (Zartman, n.d., p. 232). The 
first reason why conflicting parties may be willing to be mediated is to overcome such a 
stalemate.  
Secondly, the literature on international mediation illustrates that conflicting parties 
may accept a mediation offer on the ground that ‘mediator will actually nudge, influence, or 
‘deliver’ the other’ (Bercovitch, 2011, p. 21; see also Zartman and Touval, 1985) (the issue 
of ‘delivery’ will be dealt with extensively at a later stage in this chapter). Thirdly, conflicting 
states can believe that the result they will achieve will be more beneficial than the one that 
would be achieved through negotiating directly with each other (Zartman and Touval, 1996, 
p. 450). Fourthly, Bercovitch asserts that conflicting parties may consider the interested 
mediator the scapegoat should the process fail, and violence erupt again (2011, p. 21). 
Having explained why mediation is offered and accepted, the next notion that we ought 
to touch upon is the how of mediation. By how, I refer to how mediators operate once their 
mediation offer is accepted after a process of detailed calculation. The spectrum on which 
mediators conduct their services range from highly passive to completely assertive 
(Kriesberg, 1998, p. 238). This range was conceptualised as ‘communication-facilitation, 
procedural (formulative) and directive strategies’ (Bercovitch, 2011). In a similar vein but 
with a different wording, Zartman identifies this spectrum as ‘communication, formulation 
and manipulation’ which he refers to as ‘the modes of mediation’ (2008a, p. 165). To better 
understand what these ‘modes’ include, Beardsley offers that the range of functions available 
to and utilised by mediators include ‘the mere hosting of talks, substantive participation in 
the negotiation process, shuttle diplomacy, or heavy-handed involvement’ where the 
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mediator affects the disputants’ motivation to conclude a settlement of the conflict (2013, p. 
57). 
When discussing this spectrum, the literature proposes two broad forms which 
mediation can take: pure mediation and power mediation. Claiming that regardless of the 
form it takes, mediation is a crucial contributor to peace, Svensson insists on his idea that 
rather than praising one and excommunicating the other, mediators should be willing to see 
the good in both types and combine them accordingly to meet the needs of their tasks (2007, 
p. 234-239). Despite the proposal made by Svensson, the debate between pure and power 
mediation is still lively and set to be continuing for a certain while until a definitive 
quantitative study illustrates which one prevails over the other; no matter how unlikely this 
is. The author of this thesis is more inclined towards those endorsing power mediation due 
to the issue of leverage discussed below, which will be reflected in the subsequent chapters 
of this thesis. However, it is necessary to shed light on both approaches to better understand 
them, and why power mediation is favoured in this thesis. 
In a pure mediation, what mediator does and how he/she does it is totally power-free, 
and the act of mediation itself renders the mediator solely a facilitator in the sense that the 
reins are introduced by the mediator but are given to the hands of the conflicting parties. 
Rubin et al. (1994) argue that when a third-party opts for pure mediation, he/she attempts to 
create trust from the disputants, to protect the disputants’ face, improve dialogue and social 
connections between the disputants (as cited in Svensson, 2007, p. 229). In pure mediation, 
mediation resembles good offices since there is an apparent lack of coercive mechanisms 
available to mediators. Beber underscores that the lack of coercion in mediation means that 
the third party will not ‘promise rewards, threaten punishment, or deliver payments or goods 
to the antagonists’ (2012, p. 400). For some scholars, this is the only acceptable form that 
mediation should take. Nonetheless, there are instances where the act of mediation took on a 
more assertive role with positive outcomes. 
As the literature shows, when mediators tend to become more assertive, they 
deliberately and concisely make use of their existing leverage(s) to alter the process of 
mediation, which is called power mediation. When employing power mediation, a mediator 
‘uses its economic, military, and political resources’ to alter the conflict and mediation 
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processes (Kleiboer, 2002 as cited in Svensson, 2007, p. 230). Power mediation, with the 
basic characteristics of pure mediation intact, relies on the availability and utilisation of 
leverages ‘in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments’ (Kocadal, 2016, p. 
174). This form of mediation does still not entail any direct usage of physical force. It is not 
an example of forcing physically but of convincing indirectly through the available resources. 
Using the previous analogy that I introduced, in power mediation, a mediator is providing 
conflicting parties with the reins of conflict and mediation, but he/she keeps holding the rein 
enabling him/her to have a direct say in the process itself and the outcome of it. Here, it 
should be noted that even when mediators are assertive, it is always up to the mediated 
conflicting parties to accept or decline the outcome of mediation, or to opt out of mediation 
altogether because it ‘is at the mercy of the disputants, and it is the ultimate challenge of the 
mediator to cultivate’ the need for mediation among the disputants (Zartman, 2008b, p. 309). 
What is it that enables a mediator to cultivate such a need?  
One group, associated mostly with the early scholars of international mediation and 
those supporting pure mediation, asserts that to cultivate such a need, a mediator should be 
neutral, unbiased, and impartial. The other group, associated mostly with the realist school 
of International Relations and those supporting power mediation – including the author of 
this thesis – puts forth that only when a mediator has enough leverage can such a need be 
cultivated. Let us evaluate each line of argumentation in a bit more detailed fashion. 
 
2.4. Neutrality, Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation 
When an inquiry into the literature on international mediation is conducted, one of the 
conclusions would be that one of the most debated and dividing topics within the context of 
international mediation is based on the concepts like neutrality, bias and impartiality both as 
required characteristics of any prospective mediator since they will help cultivate the need to 
be mediated among disputants, and as the determinants of the first pillar of mediation success.  
Similar to the discussions held over the dichotomy between pure mediation and power 
mediation as illustrated above, this debate has two distinct lines of argumentation. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the debate between pure mediation and power mediation, this 
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debate has so far not produced any scholar or practitioner favouring a mid-point between the 
two opposing sides. In what follows next, I will lay down the points raised by those who 
claim a mediator should be neutral, unbiased and impartial to (1) convince disputing parties 
to accept his/her mediation offer, and (2) to successfully navigate through the mediation 
process once his/her offer is accepted, and those who claim being neutral, unbiased and 
impartial do not necessarily yield positive outcomes and in fact they can result in an opposite 
situation. The argument of the author of this thesis is that this discussion should focus not on 
the existence/absence of neutrality, bias and impartiality and/or resources, but the degree of 
them (see below). 
Jackson (1952), Ott (1972), and Wehr (1979) were three of the forefathers of the 
scholars who argue that a mediator should be neutral, unbiased and impartial (as cited in 
Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014, p. 320). For these and similar scholars, these three concepts 
are the pinnacles of the acceptance of any mediation initiative. They ruled out the possibility 
of a biased and partial mediator being accepted let alone managing a particular conflict. For 
Bercovitch and Houston, the root of these traditional arguments derives from ‘the failure to 
recognise mediation as a reciprocal process of social interaction in which the mediator is a 
major participant’ (1996, p. 26). This interaction is crucial because it ushers in a ‘conflictual 
relationship’ where certain interests, benefits, costs are at stake (Bercovitch, 1992, p. 9; 
Bercovitch, 2011, p. 74). When scholars ignore this relationship and the impossibility of any 
neutral, unbiased, or impartial mediator stemming from the existence of such a relationship, 
especially at the international level, their arguments fail to correspond with and meet the 
needs of the realities that shape the backbone of the current international system. 
Earlier in this chapter, I have argued that the very chaotic nature of the international 
system affects the act of international mediation. The international arena is a scene to many 
different interests that may eventually lead to conflicts, and political, economic and military 
arrangements that bring certain states together while alienating the others. As Kriesberg 
underlines, the more integrated the world has become, the more likely it has been for conflicts 
to encompass a wide array of ‘shared interests’ (1995, p. 89). Therefore, no matter where a 
conflict occurs, it will entail interests and costs pertaining not only to the disputants 
themselves but also to the wider regional and/or international community. In fact, I am of the 
belief that this situation helps explain the link between a conflict and a mediator. When costs 
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and interests are at stake for a third party, it serves as a catalyst for choosing the strategy of 
mediation. The question that follows this argument is to what extent under such 
circumstances a third party may be totally neutral, impartial and unbiased. 
We now know that mediation is solely a strategy, either of conflict resolution or for 
foreign policy objectives of states, out of many available to the interested third party, chosen 
to serve the interests of the third party initiating it. As a result, when interests are involved, 
altruism cannot determine the initiation and continuation of mediation at the international 
level. Since neutrality in mediation is mostly about the lack of interest a mediator might have 
in the outcome of mediation process, and as we have just pointed out, mediation, either as a 
conflict management tool or foreign policy tool, is a strategy initiated to meet the goals of 
the mediator, it is accurate when Webb clearly illustrates that ‘mediation is not a neutral act’ 
(1988, p. 16). As Zartman underscores, owing to the fact that mediators are rarely ‘indifferent 
to the terms being negotiated’, they will attempt to prevent any term jeopardising their 
national interests from being accepted by the disputants, which eliminate any neutrality in a 
mediation setting on the part of the mediator (2008a, p. 156). Hence, in any mediation 
attempt, it is obvious that a mediator is trying to resolve a conflict in a manner that would be 
conducive to meeting its interests as much as possible. It is the existence of this web of 
interests that leads Bercovitch to rule out the possibility of a neutral mediator once and for 
all (1992, p. 6). When we examine mediation cases, neutrality can be understood in a better 
fashion. 
The US has always lacked neutrality as it has interconnected web of relations 
everywhere in the world, especially in the Middle East. Therefore, the US mediation in the 
protracted conflicts of the Middle East will be characterised by a lack of neutrality. However, 
when we examine the US mediation in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, despite its neutrality -as 
the US has a very powerful Jewish interest group making Israel the most important ally of 
the US in the Middle East – Carter was accepted as a mediator, fulfilling the first pillar of 
mediation success which is the focus of this thesis. This happened because the resources 
available to the US as the two sides knew the US would alter the dynamics of the conflict 
and use its leverages to move both sides. The US did so using its reward power (see below). 
For instance, Carter promised Israelis and Egyptians two billion dollars for cooperation 
(Bercovitch, 2004, para 18). This issue is related more to the idea of resources than neutrality.  
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There are those cases where neutrality is sought after in mediators by disputants. 
However, as it is not likely to have too many neutral states in the international arena, such 
cases are limited, and they are mediated by specific countries, which I refer to as the deviant 
cases in neutrality, such as Switzerland. As a small country that is not a party to any military 
and/or political alliance that would render it unneutral, Switzerland has carved out a statue 
for itself as a neutral mediator. However, its mediation is accepted in less protracted conflicts 
where the two disputants are still able to maintain a certain level of relationship even without 
a mediator. Since in protracted conflicts, the states which can be manipulative, are more 
likely to succeed, in terms of both pillars of success, and since manipulation requires 
resources, neutral countries, such as Switzerland, are not likely to mediate protracted 
international/intercultural conflicts, an example of which is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
the focus of this thesis.  
An argument similar to that for neutrality can be made for the concept of bias in 
international mediation. When a mediator is biased, he/she ‘has something at stake and is 
closer to one side than the other – politically, economically, and culturally’ (Carnevale and 
Arad, 1996, p. 40). To criticise those who render being unbiased as a focal point of 
international mediation, Kolb and Babbitt focus on the fact that the configuration of the 
current international system compels each and every single actor of that system to ally itself 
with one actor or the other reducing the likelihood of achieving a total absence of bias towards 
other actors, and hence towards disputants in a conflict that third party is offering its 
mediation for (1995, p. 77). In addition to ruling out the possibility of finding any unbiased 
third party at the international level, we can also endorse the notion that a biased mediator 
helps tilt a conflict more towards its resolution, through what is coined as delivery based on 
the idea that ‘the mediator will influence the opponent into concessions leading to an 
agreement acceptable to the first party’ (Stephens, 1988, p. 61). When a mediator is biased 
towards one of the conflicting parties, he/she is expected to deliver the party he/she is biased 
towards to an agreement with the other party in the conflict (Zartman, 2008a, p. 162; Zartman 
and Touval, 1996, p. 451). Although Beber (2012), in his qualitative study, attempted to 
disprove this point, the experimental studies conducted by Carnevale and Arad (1996), and 
the qualitative study of Kocadal (2016) on kin-state biased mediation clearly prove the 
practicality of having a biased mediator in terms of managing a conflict. Additionally, when 
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the terms neutrality and bias are considered as opposing elements in mediation, the 
quantitative study of Svensson (2009) becomes much more important and telling as the study 
shows that when it comes to the longevity of peace agreements in civil wars, biased mediation 
leads to more durable peace agreements than neutral mediation, revealing that being neutral 
is not of high importance in mediation. However, it should be noted that although being 
biased is not a detrimental factor to the acceptance of a mediation offer, the first pillar of 
mediation success, too much bias can be problematic as well. For instance, when the Trump 
administration announced that the US recognises Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the 
Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, stated that the US would not be accepted as a 
mediator in the conflict (Beaumont, 2017). Therefore, it can be stated that the discussion may 
be more valid if the focus is not on the existence of bias and its negative impact on the 
acceptance of mediation offers, but on the degree of bias and its negative impact on the 
acceptance of mediation offers. Nonetheless, such a level of bias is not so common in 
international mediation and it is not the case among any potential mediator in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. 
The third term discussed extensively in the literature is impartiality. This term is not to 
be confused with neutrality and is defined as ‘an even-handedness, objectivity and fairness 
towards the parties’ (Boulle, 1996, p. 19 as cited in Field, 2002, para 7). However, Field 
(2002) also states that ‘[t]he idea of redressing power imbalances’ is against the basic 
components of the term impartiality. Bercovitch, pointing to the fact that a mediator should 
first be acceptable to both disputants, asserts that what determines this acceptance is not the 
(perceived) impartiality of a mediator but the conclusion that the mediator offering his/her 
services is capable of managing the conflict he/she intends to mediate which is related to the 
possession of required skills and resources (1996, p. 5). Hence, if a mediator is seen as 
acceptable because he/she can resolve a particular conflict owing to its resources, the fact 
that he/she is biased, unneutral and partial does not create further obstacles as claimed by 
certain scholars. Additionally, Zartman puts forth that rather than impartiality, disputants 
consider the possible outcomes of the acceptance or rejection of any mediation attempt by a 
third party taking into account the likely impact of accepting or rejecting a mediation attempt 
on the outcome of their conflicts and on the relationship between them and the interested 
mediator in the years to come (2008a, p. 161; see also Zartman and Touval, 1996, p. 451).  
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For instance, although the US was a partial actor in the Bosnian conflict favouring 
Bosnians over Serbians to create a ‘balance of power’, or ‘redressing power imbalances’ as 
Field (2002, para 9) puts it, its mediation was still accepted because it stood out as a party 
that could impact both sides, and the post-mediation environment can also be seen as 
successful owing to the fact that the involvement of the US and other international forces 
implied the continuation of military use against Serbians and overturned the military 
successes of the Serbian side (Cousens, 1997, pp. 789, 792-797 as cited in Austermiller, 2006, 
p. 134). This is important because even impartiality, hailed as one of the most important 
factors determining the acceptance of mediation offers, the first pillar of mediation success, 
can be ignored by mediators under certain circumstances when it is deemed necessary to do 
so. Additionally, to ignore impartiality, it is necessary for mediators to have resources to be 
utilised, showing the importance of resources.   
Thus, it can be claimed that along with the ability of a mediator to bring about a 
peaceful management of a conflict, the cost-benefit analysis conducted by disputants also 
determine the likelihood of a mediation offer being accepted and leading to a peaceful 
management. Such a cost-benefit analysis has got more to do with the leverage of a mediator 
than with the considerations pertaining to neutrality, bias and impartiality (see Touval, 1982 
as cited in Touval and Zartman, 1996, p. 451). 
In short, as Bercovitch puts it whether a mediator is partial or not does not have any 
impact on the way mediation is understood and/or concluded successfully (1996, p. 6). This 
is the case especially in protracted international conflicts where one side is better off than the 
other.  On the contrary, success and/or failure of mediation is a broader concept not to be 
restricted to neutrality, absence of bias, and impartiality. So, if it is resources available to a 
mediator that determines the acceptance of international mediation proposals, how does 
leverage function in international mediation? This is the question we now turn to. 
 
2.5. Leverage in International Mediation: A Key to Success? 
Zartman and Touval (1996) describe leverage as ‘the ability to move a party in an 
intended direction’ (p. 455). The intended direction can favour the mediator, one of the 
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conflicting parties, all the conflicting parties, or all the conflicting parties along with the 
mediator himself/herself. The intended direction can be shaped by a wide variety of interests 
pertaining to prospective mediators. Why and how a certain leverage is employed also 
reflects the position of the mediator vis-à-vis the conflicting parties that he/she mediates. As 
Bercovitch articulates, leverage is based on the resources possessed by a particular mediator 
(1992, p. 19). When mediators reveal that they have resources and can make use of their 
resources to manage a conflict, they can cultivate the need to be mediated among the 
disputants of that conflict. How does this work then? 
At a very basic level, more resourceful, and hence assertive, mediators are more 
successful and more able to cultivate the need for mediation among disputants because their 
leverages will have a direct impact on calculations made by disputants to accept or reject a 
mediation offer, a major point we have already covered.  To better understand this process, 
it is necessary to put forth the way resources function in international mediation. Although 
there are different arguments on resources of a mediator that affect the success or failure of 
any mediation attempt, the one that will be employed in this thesis is that of Jeffrey Rubin 
who developed his argument relying on the idea of ‘social influence proposed originally by 
French and Raven and modified by Raven more than thirty years later’ (Bercovitch, 1992, p. 
19). Rubin underscores that ‘six different bases of power exist for influencing another 
person’s behaviour: reward, coercion, expertise, legitimacy, reference, and information’ 
(1992, p. 255). Since these ‘six bases of power’ will constitute the core of evaluating the role 
of resources in the first pillar of success of Russian and Turkish mediation attempts over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in this thesis, it is critical to elaborate on each form of 
power/resources.  
‘Reward power’ refers to the idea of mediator providing disputants with positive 
incentives once they choose to cooperate (Rubin, 1992, p. 255). The logic behind ‘coercive 
power’ is based on mediator employing ‘the language of threat’ to ensure compliance (Rubin, 
1992, p. 255). In short, while ‘reward power’ represents carrots, ‘coercive power’ reflects 
sticks. ‘Expert power’ entails the idea that a mediator will rely on crafting an image of itself 
as a party with the necessary ‘information or expertise that justifies a particular interest’ 
(Rubin, 1992, p. 255). In other words, expertise is a leverage aimed at improving the standing 
of a particular mediator among disputants in terms of the ability to deal with the issues 
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pertaining to a conflict with ease due to the level of experience on the matters of the conflict. 
The other resource related to ‘expert power’ is ‘informational power’ that can be seen as the 
next step of ‘expert power’ as ‘informational power’ relies on what information implied 
through ‘expert power’ has really been delivered to the conflicting parties (Rubin, 1992, p. 
256). This means that while a mediator with expertise relies on the impressions on the part 
of the mediated, a mediator who has ‘informational power’ delivers the very knowledge that 
the aforementioned impression relies on to the disputants to be considered. 
The other resource that a mediator possess is the ‘legitimate power’ which is based on 
the idea of ‘having the right to make a request’ (Rubin, 1992, p. 255). If a mediator has a 
right to act as a mediator, then the accompanying assumption will be that the disputants will 
be more likely to accept and cooperate with such a mediator. With regards to this, Bercovitch 
claims that as a third-party interested in mediating a conflict is going to offer its services to 
alter the negative impact of a specific conflict, this motive justifies the third-party’s 
mediation as a legitimate move (1996, p. 3). A similar argument is laid down by Zartman and 
Touval who claim that the interest in resolving a conflict provides any third party with an 
opportunity to legitimise their actions as a third party (1996, p. 446). Rubin asserts that it is 
a common expectation that any third-party interested in mediating a conflict will attempt to 
justify its intervention in the form of mediation as a legit action using the ‘legitimate power’ 
(1992, p. 269).  
The last resource that may be at the disposal of a mediator is the ‘referent power’ which 
revolves around the point that in any given mediation setting, both the mediator and the 
mediated will respect and care about their relationship with each other (Rubin, 1992, p. 256). 
So, if there is a valuable relationship between the mediator and the mediated, this kind of a 
resource will be highly respected and effective. Additionally, the author of the thesis takes 
this view forward and claims that ‘referent power’ by the virtue of foreseeing a valuable 
relationship, includes the idea that if a mediator can ‘refer’ the disputants to mediation thanks 
to the concerns pertaining to the valued relationship between all the parties involved, he/she 
will have further leverage over the disputants, a literal approach to the ‘referent power’ in the 
sense of delivery.  
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What the preceding section on the how of mediation reveals is that mediation is not a 
simple third-party initiative that can be restricted to facilitation or good offices. It 
incorporates a variety of strategies and forms of leverage, which mediators, when they are 
able to do so, are more than willing to make use of. These resources are integral, and indeed 
determining, factors of any mediation procedure, especially the first pillar of success and/or 
failure, which is one of the core pillars of this thesis. So, how can we evaluate success in 
international mediation? 
 
2.6. Success in International Mediation 
Success is a highly subjective element. This is the case in international mediation as 
well. Scholars interested in international mediation have so far provided various definitions 
of and criteria for success in international mediation. Just like the definitions of mediation 
itself, approaches to mediation success has ranged from narrow to broad. The spectrum is 
determined by the number and type of criteria associated with success in each approach. 
One of the most detailed accounts of success has been provided by Bercovitch and 
Houston who include a wide array of independent variables and conclude that mediation is 
deemed successful provided the process contributed thoroughly ‘to the management of a 
conflict and the subsequent interaction between the parties’ (1996, p. 19). Additionally, these 
two scholars introduced additional types of success which are ‘partially successful’ leading 
to ‘negotiations and a dialogue between the parties’ and ‘limited success’ resulting in solely 
a cessation of hostilities (1996, p. 19). 
Bringing the different elements discussed by Bercovitch and Houston together, 
Kriesberg contends that ‘mediation is successful insofar as it contributes significantly to a 
de-escalating movement, to mutually acceptable agreement, or to reconciliation, and is 
responsive to the prevailing conditions’ (1996, p. 220). Focusing more on the substantive 
issues, Fisher and Keashly assert that ‘[a] successful outcome for mediation is a settlement 
on specific substantive issues which balances losses and gains, and which is satisfactory to 
all parties’ (1988, p. 390) 
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The earlier, narrower but still useful definition of mediation success was provided by 
Frei (1976). His definition of success revolved around the idea of the acceptance of mediation 
offers by both disputants (as cited in Kleiboer, 1996, p. 361; Wallensteen and Svensson, 
2014, p. 322). For Frei, when a mediation initiative is accepted, it is deemed as a successful 
mediation. Nevertheless, unlike Frei (1976) who sees the acceptance of mediation offers as 
tantamount to mediation success, this thesis will take the definition of success proposed by 
Frei (1976) not as the evaluation of mediation success as a whole, but as one portion of it, 
the first-pillar of mediation success as it is coined in this work. This is because the definition 
of mediation success offered by Frei (1976) is quite limited in scope and not entirely 
applicable to the realities of today’s world. Since that pillar provides a common ground for a 
comparison of Russian and Turkish mediation attempts in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
the definition of Frei (1976) will be used in this thesis while analysing the first pillar of 
mediation success. It is important to state why. 
When mediation is seen as a conflict resolution method, success will have two pillars. 
The first one will be the acceptance of mediation as put forth by Frei (1976), and the post-
mediation environment, that is resolution or no-resolution as proposed by Bercovitch and 
Houston (1996). When mediation is regarded as a foreign policy tool carrying the aim of 
achieving national interests by those that offer their mediation services, success will have the 
same two pillars with an important difference. Since the reason behind offering mediation 
will be meeting national interests of mediators, although the importance of the acceptance of 
mediation by both disputants of will be quite the same, the post-mediation environment will 
not have a high impact on determining the success of mediation. States that see mediation as 
a foreign policy tool may just focus on managing conflicts that they mediate and/or keeping 
the conflict under control to be able to manipulate disputants. An example of such a country 
is Russia. It is known that Russia, especially when dealing with the conflicts taking place in 
the post-Soviet zone, aims at manipulating conflicts to have disputants within its reach and 
at meeting its national interests rather than resolving those conflicts. An example of a state 
viewing mediation both as a foreign policy tool and as a method of conflict management is 
Turkey. Turkey has been using mediation to increase its standing in the international system 
and to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflicts it tries to mediate rather than 
manipulating the disputants of those conflicts for its own gains. However, for both countries, 
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being acceptable to the both disputants of a given conflict will be quite important as it will 
be the first step, or pillar, of their mediation success and/or failure. 
When Fisher elaborates on Frei’s conceptualisation of success, he underlines the five 
criteria that Frei made use of which are ‘the identity and characteristic of the parties, the 
interrelations among the parties, the characteristics of the conflict, the identity and 
characteristic of the mediator, and the relationship between the mediator and the parties’ 
(1995, p. 44). In this thesis, the first two criteria will be ignored because they are constant no 
matter who the mediator is. Although the third criterion – the characteristics of the conflict – 
is also constant, it will be discussed in this thesis through the history of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict because it will give certain ideas as to ‘the identity and characteristic of 
the mediator’ and ‘the relationship between the mediator and the parties’, the remaining two 
criteria of Frei (1976).  
In what follows, the author will first provide a brief historical account of the conflict 
discussing the actors of the conflict (criterion 3). The author will then proceed with the 
bilateral relations of Turkey and Russia with the conflicting parties (criteria 4 and 5). Having 
analysed these three criteria, the author will initiate a discussion using the ‘six bases of 
power’ concept of Rubin (1992) to better understand the criteria 4 and 5, and hence the 
success of mediation, and test the hypothesis put forth in the previous chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: TIME, GEOGRAPHY 
AND ACTORS 
 
The South Caucasus is a region shaped by various conflicts within and between the 
states inhabiting the region. There is a plethora of conflicts involving Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan as main actors, the ethnic, religious and/or linguistic minority groups living in 
these countries, and the states that surround or have interests in the region such as Turkey, 
Russia and Iran. Of these conflicts, those between Armenia(ns) and Azerbaijan(is) are quite 
important not only because they linger on waiting to be resolved but also because they are 
rooted in history and draw in two major regional powers supporting one side, i.e. Turkey 
supporting Azerbaijan and Russia supporting Armenia. 
As Tokluoğlu (2011, p. 1228) asserts, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is not the 
conflict but one of the conflicts between Armenians and Azerbaijanis with the others being 
about the disputed territories of Nakhichevan and Zangezur. Nevertheless, the conflicts over 
the two latter territories have so far not been as fatal as the one over Nagorno-Karabakh. It is 
crucial to understand why. 
Nagorno-Karabakh is a land-locked region (Figure 1) which is, according to the 
international community, a part of the Azerbaijani jurisdiction, further supported by various 
UNSC Resolutions (Uzer, 2012, p. 247). Contrary to its geographic size, the region played a 
central and large role in the relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis along with their 
supporters at both the intra-state (minority groups) and inter-state (regional powers) levels 
for centuries.  
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Figure 1: The map of Nagorno-Karabakh along with the other contested territories following the start of the current phase 
of the conflict in 1988. The geographical reading of the map reveals why Turkey and Russia have interests in the region 
and can play a vital role as a promoter of both peace and conflict  
 
The first period of the conflict, or the earliest time the disputants refer to while shaping 
their policies towards Nagorno-Karabakh, can be traced back to the early 11th century. As 
Rasizade (2011) discusses in his article, the region was inhabited by Armenian and 
Azerbaijani people, and invaded by Turkic, Russian and Persian empires changing hands 
occasionally until the early eleventh and twentieth centuries. While the Turks had tensions 
with the Armenians due to ethnic and religious differences and favoured Muslim Azerbaijani 
people, the tsarist rule under the Russian Empire followed an exact opposite pattern 
(Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 38-39). As Harutinian (2010, pp. 58-59) illustrates, the religious 
affiliation between Russians and Armenians made it easier for the former to maintain the 
control over different ethnic groups within the empire and the latter to rise in the social and 
political life leading to a class-based struggle in which Armenians outweighed Azeris3 in the 
South Caucasus. These two historical facts are crucial because it reveals that it is so natural 
to observe references to Turks and Russians both in narratives of the disputants for Nagorno-
Karabakh and the foreign policy attitudes of the disputants towards the conflict, which makes 
Turks and Russians two inseparable actors of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in terms of 
both its prolongation and its resolution.  
                                                          
3 In this thesis, the terms “Azerbaijani” and “Azeri” are used interchangeably. 
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Although Azerbaijan and Armenia became independent in the early 21st century, it did 
not last long as the region saw an annexation by the USSR destroying any claims over 
Nagorno-Karabakh between the two states. As Uzer and Baguirov (2012, p. 134) reveal, the 
Soviet regime placed Nagorno-Karabakh within the Azeri SSR as an autonomous region. 
Even though the early decision of the USSR was to include Nagorno-Karabakh in the 
Armenian state, the decision was reversed with the suggestion of Stalin and the region was 
handed in to the Azeri state with the hopes of enabling the Soviets to keep the area under 
control through manipulation (Mkrtchyan, n.d., p. 3).Additionally, such a decision was 
necessary to be made due to the provisions of the Moscow Treaty signed between Turkey 
and the USSR, and this was deemed to be a favour of Moscow for Turkey (Cornell, 1998, p. 
53). This region was to be a thorny issue for the Soviet administration: despite being a region 
of 1,700 square miles with a population of 186,100 people according to a Soviet census 
conducted in 1989 (Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 35), the ethnic division of the population did not 
match the political decision of the Soviets because the Azerbaijani population constituted just 
one-fourth of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh (BBC, 2016, para. 13).  
The oppressive regime of the USSR aimed at mitigating the impact of nationalist/ethnic 
thoughts and the results of them that led to conflicts instead of dealing with them properly. 
This approach worked for some time until Gorbachev came to power in Moscow. His 
policies, “glasnost” and “perestroika”, with the hopes of increasing the level of democracy 
and freedom in the Soviet Union, resulted in a so-called democratic atmosphere lacking the 
required tools to manage and enjoy democracy. To illustrate, the citizens of the USSR started 
discussing their problems, which were coped with by force by the state apparatus in Moscow, 
openly and publicly as a result of “glasnost” (Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 36; Ambrosio, 2011, p. 
95). 
This ‘democratic’ turn marked the third and continuing phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.  Basing their arguments on the ‘thriving’ democracy within the USSR, Armenians 
living in Nagorno-Karabakh petitioned for a transfer of the region from Azerbaijan to 
Armenia, getting the support of the latter and criticism of the former (Carley, 1998, p. 1). In 
addition to the political reaction in these two states, popular reactions were similar leading to 
clashes which brought about the death of tens of people among both sides. These clashes 
mostly stemmed from the lack of democratic mechanisms within the region despite the 
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democratisation led by Gorbachev as this democratisation was incomplete and lacked ripe 
institutions and mechanisms required to deal with the region (Mkrtchyan, n.d., p. 3). 
Within time, the clashes intensified and evolved into a total war between Azerbaijan 
and Nagorno-Karabakh, which received continuing support from Yerevan (Gamaghelyan, 
n.d., p. 4), ‘including the direct involvement of the Armenian army’ (Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 
36). As Uzer and Baguirov (2012, p. 135) assert, without the required military equipment 
and support from a strong regional power, Azerbaijan could not emerge victorious out of the 
war which created a country recognised by no state including Armenia. The only support 
Azerbaijan received was from Turkey which sent military instructors whereas Armenia had 
the full support of Russia which provided Armenians with military equipment (Rasizade, 
2011, p. 219). Given that Turkey was going through a problematic domestic phase in the 
1990s and Russia was trying to surge as a regional and global power and able to provide more 
support than Turkey, Armenians got the upper hand. 
Despite Russia’s involvement in the war by supporting Armenia over Azerbaijan, the 
war, which lasted for three years and claimed thousands of lives, was ended with a ceasefire 
brokered unilaterally by Russia in 1994 (Croissant, 1998 as cited in Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 
37; Hedenskog and Korkmaz, 2016, p. 1; Hopmann and Zartman, 2010, p. 2; Hirose and 
Jasutis, 2014, p. 2). The ceasefire left around 20% of the territories of Azerbaijan under the 
control of Armenians (Lindenstrauss, 2015, p. 98) and the conflict ‘entered its “frozen” 
phase’ (Ambrosio, 2011, p. 58). In short, Broers (2015, p. 556) summarises the 
‘metamorphosis’ or phases of the conflict, by revealing that: 
   ‘the Karabakh conflict featured a wider scope and variety of violence, 
encompassing communal violence and pogroms in 1988–1990; a small-scale 
Soviet civil war involving opposed army and irregular units in 1991; an all-out 
war between two newly established sovereign states in 1992–1994; the massive 
forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally 
displaced persons; and the extensive occupation of territories far beyond those 
originally under dispute’ 
The conflict, with its unresolved repercussions, has so far attracted many actors both 
from and outside the region, and remains as one of the ‘frozen’ conflicts waiting to be 
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resolved. However, it is also the case that the involvement of such actors has made the 
conflict and efforts to resolve it much more complex and difficult to handle (Hirose and 
Jasutis, 2014, p. 11). This stagnation has a potential of turning the conflict into a full-fledged 
war bringing in regional powers, most probably Russia and Turkey, in the form of a proxy 
war (Hedenskog and Korkmaz, 2016, p. 1). As German (2012, p. 216) underlines, the 
possibility of such a war is heightened by the Russian military presence in Armenia and 
continuing Turkish support for Azerbaijan. This point is quite crucial because it means that 
there are interests of Russia and Turkey towards the conflict which make the two countries 
biased towards one of the conflicting parties (This topic is beyond the scope of this chapter 
and will be covered extensively in the following chapters while discussing the relations of 
Russia and Turkey with the disputants). In other words, Russia and Turkey are two secondary 
actors with direct ties and stakes at the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and who are willing to 
act as the mediator of the conflict. 
Clarifying the actors (especially primary and secondary actors) is necessary here 
because it will enable us to better understand why, in this thesis, it is the acceptance and/or 
rejection of a mediation offer by Armenia and Azerbaijan, but not Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians, that is accepted as an indicator of the first pillar of success and failure of 
mediation, and why the mediation of Russia (success) and Turkey (failure) has been chosen 
to refute those viewing neutrality and related characteristics as prerequisites to be accepted 
as a mediator and to support those who claim that it is the resources available to a prospective 
mediator that determines the likelihood of acceptance (success) of its mediation offer rather 
than its being neutral. 
While discussing the success and failure of mediation offers by Russia and Turkey 
respectively Armenia and Azerbaijan are going to be used as the two reference actors because 
these two states were accepted as the primary actors in the conflict and given the authority to 
carry out the negotiations in what is known as the ‘Baker Rules’ (Ambrosio, 2011, p. 98). 
Even though following the advances of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians along with the 
Armenian military in 1994, which cost Azerbaijan one fifth of its territory, Azerbaijan 
accepted Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians as a primary actor to the conflict, this was soon 
overturned (Rasizade, 2011, p. 222). Even though Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians 
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participated in in the peace process in 1997, it did not last long (Carley, 1998, p. 2). There 
are two explanations of that. 
Firstly, Azeris aimed at saving their face through an international conflict, especially 
when the support of Moscow to Yerevan became visible (Carley, 1998, p. 10). If the Azeri 
state accepted the war as an intrastate war, it would admit that it lost the war to a small part 
of it. Secondly, it would be easier for to have one party to discuss the conflict with rather 
than dealing with two parties that support each other in peace talks (Lindenstrauss, 2015, p. 
104).  
Since no state, including Armenia, does not recognise the Republic of Nagorno-
Karabakh as an independent state, the negotiations are taking place only between Baku and 
Yerevan (de Waal, 2010, p. 159). Such a situation is acceptable to Armenia as well since it 
enables the Armenian ruling elite to have a direct control over Nagorno-Karabakh to use the 
conflict in the internal affairs of Armenia as a political leverage against the opposition and to 
follow their own agenda toward the conflict. To illustrate, the skirmishes in 2008 in Nagorno-
Karabakh were manipulated by the Armenian ruling elite to eliminate the focus on rigged 
elections (Valiyev, 2012, p. 198). Additionally, it is also known that Robert Kocharyan and 
Serzh Sargsyan, who served as presidents of the Republic of Armenia, are originally from 
Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh, making Armenia a natural representative of Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict an inseparable aspect of Armenian 
foreign policy. 
To sum up, due to the historical facts referred to above which clearly support the 
argument that Armenia and Azerbaijan have so far acted and been regarded as the primary 
actors especially in the current phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (1988 onwards), 
which is the main focus of this thesis, while determining the firs pillar of success and failure 
of mediation offers towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this thesis will rely on the 
decisions made by Armenia and Azerbaijan for mediation offers by Russians and Turks. 
Additionally, as shown above, since Turkey and Russia, as secondary actors with vested 
interests in the region, cannot be regarded as unbiased, impartial and neutral actors, claiming 
that neutrality of a mediator determines the acceptance (the first pillar of success) of a 
mediation initiative will not help understand why the mediation offers of one of the two 
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biased actors have so far been accepted whereas those of the other have been rejected, 
especially by Armenia. To solve this puzzle, we need to go beyond neutrality discussions and 
rely on the Realist International Relations School with its emphasis on power, leverage and 
resources available to a state as the determinant(s) of its mediation offers being accepted as 
the author of this thesis has already outlined in the previous chapter. To do so, it is necessary 
to evaluate, along with the characteristics of Russia and Turkey as possible mediators in the 
conflict, the relations of Russia and Turkey with the primary actors of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict so that we can reveal the characteristics of the two interested mediators (Russia and 
Turkey) and their relations with the conflicting parties, which are significant determinants of 
mediation success (Frei, 1976). These two chapters on the foreign policy patterns of Russia 
and Turkey will be followed by an analysis chapter where the ‘six bases of power’ concept 
of Jeffrey Rubin (1992), discussed in the previous chapter, will be employed to better 
comprehend the link between foreign policy and resources available to potential mediators, 
Russia and Turkey in our case study, and the impact of such resources on the likelihood of 
the first pillar of success of their mediation initiatives. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE FIRST TRIANGLE: TURKEY-ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN 
 
4.1. Turkey and the South Caucasus 
Due to historical ties and geographical considerations in the sense that the South 
Caucasus connects Turkey to the Central Asia, Southern Caucasus has a special place for 
Turkey, and hence, in Turkish foreign policy (TMFA, n.d.a, para. 1). Given that Turkey is 
neighbouring the South Caucasus, it has been preoccupied with the developments taking 
place in its neighbourhood, especially after the post-Soviet era. As Aras (2005, p. 112) 
argues, the widespread nationalist sentiments in Turkish foreign policy back in the years 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union made the policy makers pay a specific attention 
to the emerging reality in the Central Asia and South Caucasus, ‘a new safe zone of Turkish 
identity’. 
Azerbaijan stands out as the biggest ally that Turkey has acquired from the ruins of the 
USSR, especially its aforementioned Turkish zone. This, I believe, resulted initially from the 
fact that following its independence, Azerbaijan favoured Turkey in its policies under 
Elchibey who was too determined to follow a pro-Turkish, secular and anti-Iranian policies 
(Cornell, 1998, p. 59). The two states are historically, culturally, linguistically and ethnically 
so close to each other that the relations are highly positive not only at the state level but also 
at the societal level. For instance, when the entry representing Azerbaijan at the 2011 
Eurovision Song Contest, in which Turkey did not participate, won the contest, the singers 
hit the stage to re-perform their winning song with both Azeri and Turkish flags (Habertürk, 
2011). Similarly, at the state level, following the assumption of office, the first official visits 
of the leaders of both countries are traditionally made to each other which has a symbolic 
meaning (Ibrahimov, 2011, p. 15, TMFA, n.d.b, para. 2). 
As Ismailzade clearly illustrates, the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are 
highly advanced which have so far seen overt Turkish support for Azerbaijan in military, 
economic and political terms (2005, p. 107). For instance, since the outbreak of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, at the international level, Turkey has advocated for the approach to the 
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conflict endorsed by Azeris (Cornell, 1998, p. 51). Contrary to the fact that Turkey has highly 
positive relations with Azerbaijan, related but not restricted to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, the Turkish-Armenian relations have been ill-fated which have so far been 
characterised by a long-sustained hostility, closed borders, absence of diplomatic relations, 
and a trade embargo imposed on Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan.  
These closed borders stemming originally from the Nagorno-Karabakh war have 
negatively affected not only the bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia, and 
Armenia and Azerbaijan but also the wider South Caucasus region preventing it from 
evolving into a stable region (Broers, 2015, pp. 556-557). Though Turkey and Armenia 
embarked on a recent rapprochement journey in 2009, the process failed in 2010 which 
increased the gap between Turkey and Armenia, while bringing Turkey and Azerbaijan even 
closer as Turkey utilised this period to strengthen its bilateral ties with Azerbaijan (Aras & 
Akpınar, 2011, p. 62).  
Due to a variety of reasons, with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being only one of 
them – indeed one of the most significant ones – Turkish-Armenian relations have not 
evolved into a friendly and neighbourly nature as opposed to the highly positive bilateral 
relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. To better understand these opposing patterns of 
relations between Turkey and the two disputants in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the 
impact of these patterns on Turkish mediation in the conflict, it is required to lay down the 
historical and current situation between Turkey and these two conflicting states separately. 
This chapter will present one of the foundations of the discussion chapter of this thesis in 
which the author will evaluate the impact of the role of resources of Turkey on Turkish 
mediation attempts over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because this chapter will give clues 
about those resources. 
 
4.2. Turkish-Armenian Relations 
Turkish-Armenian relations, ever since the independence of the latter, have revolved 
around notions of uneasiness, historical enmity, mistrust, and national interests. When the 
Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, paving the way for the establishment of new states in the 
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Caucasus and Central Asia, the relations between Turkey and Armenia proved to be 
promising, if not friendly. In fact, Turkey was one of the countries that recognised the 
independence of Armenia earliest, seconded only by the United States (Alipour, 2015, p. 
195). As Aras and Özbay note, Turkey invited Armenia to the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organisation although Armenia is not a country bordering the Black Sea (2008, 
p. 2). Such a positive attitude was initially embraced and reciprocated by the Armenian side 
as well. The then president of Armenia, Ter-Petrosyan, relying on a highly pragmatic 
approach, attempted to reconcile the grievances surrounding the relations between Turkey 
and Armenia so that Armenia would be able to have a wide door opening to the West (Kirişçi 
and Moffatt, 2015, p. 76), and show its total independence from Russia in the international 
sphere (Hill, Kirişçi and Moffatt, 2015, p. 132; Petros, 2003, p. 4).  
Nevertheless, these initial opportunities proved to be futile due to two main reasons. 
The first one is the ousting of Ter-Petrosyan by Kocharyan, a former Nagorno-Karabakh 
leader and a hardliner politician with strong ties to the Armenian Diaspora (Hill, Kirişçi and 
Moffatt, 2015, p. 133). The more hard-liner the Armenian state evolved specifically towards 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the events of 1915, and Turkey, the more difficult it became for Turkey 
to develop relations with Armenia. The second one is related to the escalation of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict from an intra-state to an inter-state war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Following the apparent involvement of Armenia proper in the war, Turkey condemned the 
Armenian side as the aggressor state in the region and cut the diplomatic ties with it 
(Ismailzade, 2005, p. 107).  
In addition to the closure of the border, Süleyman Demirel, who was the Turkish 
president in 1993, asked for a business embargo on the Armenian state; which was taken as 
a proof of the solidarity between Turkey and Azerbaijan (Goshgarian, 2005, p. 3). The closure 
of the border between the two countries prohibiting any possibility of trade and tourism 
between the two sides (Oskanian, 2011, p. 24), persists today limiting economic possibilities 
to be realised by two societies (Valiyev, 2012, p. 200). Moreover, seeing the troubles 
encountered by the Azeris in the war, Ankara initiated troop-deployment on Armenian border 
and warned the Armenian side ‘to desist from invading the Nakhichevan Autonomous 
Republic’, whose existence was guaranteed by Turkey as stated in the Treaty of Kars, signed 
in 1921 by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (Rasizade, 2011, p. 222).  
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There are certain, and highly interrelated, causes of the hostility that shaped Turkish-
Armenian relations. To start with, the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire created tensions 
which had (continuing) repercussions not only at the state level but also at the societal level 
between the two countries. The opinion of Turkey and Armenia regarding the events differ 
from each other too much that it makes it even harder for any reconciliation to succeed before 
proper preparations at the communal level. It is known that taking into account ‘Article 2 of 
the 1948 Genocide Convention’, Ankara has so far acknowledged the events of 1915 
avoiding the term genocide (Görgülü, Iskandaryan & Minasyan, 2010, p. 1), a policy that has 
commonly been referred to as outright denial. When we take a look at the official position of 
the Armenian state vis-a-vis the events of 1915, we can see that Armenia is not just regarding 
the events as genocide, but it also endeavours to seek international recognition in line with 
its official stance. The 11th clause of the Armenian Declaration of Independence (1990) 
obliges Armenia to seek ‘international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey 
and Western Armenia’. For the achievement of this goal, Armenia relies heavily on the efforts 
of Armenian Diaspora, the objectives and methods of which increased the already existing 
gap between the two states/peoples. This is because the activities of the diaspora in this regard 
has led to a backlash rendering Turkey more rigid on recognising the claims of genocide 
(Giragosian, 2009, p. 3). As Gamaghelyan (2010, p. 44) underlines, such efforts, with the 
expected demands of territorial and monetary reparations by the Armenian side, were deemed 
virulent and regarded as moves with the aim of deteriorating the image of Turkey, which has 
further alienated the two nations and states from each other. 
A related issue that has proved to be thorny regarding and jeopardised Turkish-
Armenian relations is the Moscow Treaty of 1921 that determined the eastern borders of 
Turkey. As Cornell mentions, the decision of Armenia to reject the Moscow Treaty, and 
hence the determined borders between the two countries, hindered ‘the establishment of 
future diplomatic relations’ (1998, p. 65-66). This is related to the Armenian genocide issue 
because should Turkey accept genocide and to pay compensations to the victims of it, it might 
be possible to see a change-over demand by Armenians regarding the eastern territories of 
Turkey, referred to as Western Armenia by the Armenian state. These issues surfaced in the 
latest rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia as well. It is crucial to deal with the latest 
rapprochement here specifically because not only does it clearly illustrate the current states 
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of affair in bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia, but it also tells a lot about the 
reasons beyond the bias argument as to why Turkish mediation attempts over the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict have been a failure so far 
When the Justice and Development Party assumed power in 2002, it embarked on a 
journey of democratisation and reformation, which was successfully managed for quite some 
time (see Keyman & Gümüşçü, 2014). This reformation manifested itself also in Turkish 
foreign policy. Under the JDP rule, Turkish foreign policy evolved from the Kemalist 
understanding which over-emphasised the West and neglected the rest (Taşpınar, 2012) to a 
proactive foreign policy the architecture of which was Davutoğlu who ‘largely changed the 
rhetoric and practice of Turkish foreign policy, bringing it to a dynamic and multi-
dimensional orientation’ (Aras, 2009, p. 3).  
This ‘constructive, solution-orientated foreign policy’ (Görgülü & Krikorian, 2012) 
and the societal impact of Turkish democratisation (de Waal, 2010a, p. 169) were the main 
triggers of the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, creating a possible venue to 
overcome the burden of their disputed history on bilateral relations of the two sides. This 
rapprochement can be traced back to what has been termed as football diplomacy, which 
refers to the invitations from Sargsyan and Gül to each other to watch the matches of the 
national football teams of Armenia and Turkey held in Yerevan and Bursa respectively 
(Görgülü, Iskandaryan & Minasyan, 2010).  
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was a two-pillar process. One of them was to 
improve the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia through dialogue that Turkey 
endeavoured to achieve after a Turkish president visited Armenia for the first time, revealing 
the Turkish interest in playing the role of a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
(Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 44). Knowing that to improve relations between the two disputants 
would not be possible without improving its own relations with Armenia, Turkey attempted 
to bring the Turkish and Armenian states closer to each other, constituting the second pillar 
of the rapprochement. Attempting to leave the historical wrongs behind, Turkey initiated 
dialogues with the Armenian state hoping that Turkish-Armenian relations can take the turn 
for the better in future which would be favourable to both sides and would increase the 
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likelihood of a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, possibly through Turkish 
mediation. 
It is known that the negative relations between Turkey and Armenia, moving Turkey 
much closer to Azerbaijan while distancing these two Turkic states from Armenia, is the 
underlying reason why Armenia, while formulating its foreign policy, relies extensively on 
Russian support to balance the power dynamics (Aras and Özbay, 2008, p. 3; German, 2012, 
p. 222; Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 45). Hence, this rapprochement was to serve the dual purpose 
of eliminating hostilities between Turkey/Azerbaijan and Armenia and contributing to the 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through Turkish channels.   Additionally, since 
Turkey wants to become a full-member to the EU, normalisation of Turkish-Armenian 
relations would be beneficial to Turkey, which, in fact, was one of the reasons why Turkey 
opted for normalisation in the first place (Alipour, 2015, p. 196).  
The normalisation process started highly positively. The fact that the two sides were 
able to reach a conclusion in Zurich was a great success taking into account the previous 
years which did not see any attempts of reconciliation between the two states with the sole 
exception of the first years of the independent Armenian state. The support the US gave to 
the process acted as a further catalyst in this round of rapprochement, though it was severely 
criticised by Baku because of the implications of the American support to the Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as this, Baku thought, would 
make the Armenian position on the conflict much more rigid (Mammadov, 2015, p. 32). The 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was crucial in this process in the sense that it led both to the 
initial success and ultimate failure of the normalisation process. 
Although it was highly debated and found controversial in Turkey, throughout the 
normalisation process, Turkey did not make any reference to the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh (Görgülü, Iskandaryan & Minasyan, 2010, p. 11). This was of significant 
importance because ever since Armenia and Azerbaijan got embroiled in their conflict, 
Turkey singled out any possibility of border opening with Armenia unless a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict is reached. Therefore, there was always an issue linkage between 
the Turkish-Armenian relations and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
(Ismailzade, 2005, p. 107). Nevertheless, for the first time in its diplomatic history, Turkey 
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abstained from this stance. With hindsight, this was the result of a miscalculation on the part 
of Turkey because Turkey assumed the bilateral talks between the disputants of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict were on a highly positive note (de Waal, 2010, p. 173), showing the lack 
of information among Turkish policy makers regarding the conflict as Turkey was kept out 
of the peace process. This made the rapprochement process in Turkish-Armenian relations 
an initially successful but ultimately short-lived one because of the concerns in Ankara 
towards its relations with Baku. 
However, as Göksel underlines, Turkey’s attempts to improve its relations with 
Armenia deteriorated Ankara’s relations with Baku (2011, p. 6). That Turkey refrained from 
making its normalisation of relations with Armenia dependent on the peace process between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan created further tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan 
relied on ‘Turkish public opinion as well as its own energy card’ in order to derail Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement (Valiyev, 2010, p. 1). When Azerbaijan condemned the protocols 
and the process, and Aliyev announced that the price Turkey was paying for the Azeri natural 
gas was to be increased from 120 dollar per a thousand cubic metres to 300 dollars per a 
thousand cubic metres (Yesevi & Tiftikçigil, 2015, p. 30), and that it would find new transit 
routes for its oil and natural gas favouring Russia rather than Turkey (Alipour, 2015, p. 199), 
the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process entered a deadlock, which became null after 
Turkey and Armenia did not ratify the protocols due to the growing nationalist opposition to 
the normalisation process in both countries. The failure of the normalisation process once 
again proved that for Turkey, Azerbaijan was more important than Armenia in the South 
Caucasus, the reasons of which will be dealt with in detail in the remaining of this chapter. 
 
4.3. Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations 
When the USSR evaporated from the world map ending the Cold War, a new world 
system was emerging. The geography-wise significance of Turkey for the Western bloc 
during the Cold War was no longer available to be used as a foreign policy tool (Davutoğlu, 
2013). Therefore, Turkey had to develop a new paradigm to alter its foreign policy both in 
terms of objectives and patterns to follow through these objectives.  
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The power vacuum in the post-Soviet territories provided Turkey with a new incentive. 
Given that the majority of the former Soviet republics were Turkic, especially those in the 
Central Asia, Turkey attempted to lead them. The country was not alone in this quest. The 
West was supporting this endeavour of Turkey: Turkey, with its secular regime and Western-
outlook, would be a model for the new republics in the post-Soviet land (Cornell, 1998, p. 
69). These model country aspirations and the amusement among Turkish policy makers went 
so far in Turkey that, as Aras (2005) notes it, Süleyman Demirel, who was Turkish Prime 
Minister back then, argued the dissolution of the USSR made it possible for a massive Turkic 
zone ‘stretching from the Balkans to the Great Wall of China’ (p. 112). 
Turkey’s objectives in the Central Asia and South Caucasus were too optimistic but 
highly difficult to achieve. Owing to the limited economic power and political instability 
(Aras & Akpınar, 2011, p. 54), the rising levels of violence stemming from the Kurdish issue 
(Kirişçi and Moffatt, 2015, p. 71), and ‘the inconsistencies and contradictions of the Turkish 
model’ which was to be spread to the Turkic republics of the former USSR (Erşen, 2013, p. 
30), Turkey could not realise its objectives pertaining to the region. For instance, when the 
Soviet Union dissolved, and the Nagorno-Karabakh war turned into inter-state war between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Cyprus problem and the domestic Kurdish insurgency along 
with the fears of confronting Russia in the South Caucasus to avoid another ‘Cyprus’ in the 
region, made Turkish presence in the region and conflict, and Turkish support for Azerbaijan 
highly limited (Uzer, 2012, pp. 249, 248). As a result, the void was filled by the Russian 
Federation, which was attempting to reclaim the tight hold over the region it used to have.  
Compared to other countries in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan was always given a 
priority by Turkish policy makers which was reflected in the recognition of the independence 
of Azerbaijan well before the recognition was granted to other post-Soviet countries by 
Turkey (German, 2012, p. 222). In this context, it is natural to see that it was only Azerbaijan 
that followed a pattern similar to Turkey and had very positive relations with Turkey. In fact, 
as has already been stated, Elchibey, who was the president of the newly independent 
Azerbaijan accepted Turkey as a model country for Azerbaijan in line with his anti-Russian 
policies (Cornell, 1998, p. 58-59), making the model country discussions reciprocal. 
Nonetheless, there was more to Turkish foreign policy towards Azerbaijan than this model 
country discussion. 
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The way the bilateral relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan has been formulated 
can be divided into two parts. The first one is related to the kinship between the Turks and 
the Azeris. The second category is energy. These two categories also define certain periods 
in the relations between the two states. While the initial stages of the relations between 
Turkey and Azerbaijan were shaped by the kin-based ties between the two states (Görgülü & 
Krikorian, 2012, p. 1), from the mid-1990s onwards, the energy policies occupied the 
relations between the two countries. Let us now examine the two categories in a bit more 
detailed way to better understand their implications for the Turkish-Azeri relations, and for 
the Turkish mediation attempts vis-à-vis the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which will be made 
clear in the discussion chapter of this thesis. 
As we mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the incursion of the Armenian 
forces, both local and from Armenia proper itself, into the Azerbaijani territory to preserve 
the “Armenian nature” of Nagorno-Karabakh, while occupying the adjacent regions, angered 
Turkey. The Armenian occupation of Kelbajar in 1993 was an important turning point here 
because it interrupted ‘the direct trade from Turkey to Armenia, highway/railway and air 
connections’ (TMFA, n.d.c, para. 2) because only after this occupation did Turkey decide to 
shut down the Turkish-Armenian border (Ibrahimov, 2011, p. 17). This has had important 
ramifications. For example, this decision of Turkey consolidated the embargo imposed on 
Yerevan by Baku as there was no possibility of goods passing from Turkey to Armenia 
(Cornell, 1998, p. 61). These were all based on the kinship between the two states which 
derived mostly from the demands of the societies in each state. In Turkey, to illustrate, the 
pro-Azeri sentiments have been widespread both among the ruling elite and the public 
(Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 44). Such feelings have been reciprocal among Azeris as well. In 
fact, when Turkey and Armenia agreed for an electricity deal in the late 1990s, it was 
regarded by the Azeris as ‘a stab in the back’, leading to the termination of the deal before it 
saw the daylight (Cornell, 1998, p. 62).  
The kin-based relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan started to lose importance 
when Elchibey was ousted by a coup resulting in the advent of Haydar Aliyev as the new 
head of the Azeri state. Although he regarded Turkey and Azerbaijan as “one nation, two 
countries”, Aliyev terminated all the deals signed between the two countries under the 
previous government which granted special rights to Turkey and Turkish citizens (Yesevi & 
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Tiftikçigil, 2015, p. 28). The “Aliyev tradition” continued in 2003 when Ilham Aliyev was 
elected the new president of Azerbaijan. The major focus on Azeri foreign policy was the 
utilisation of oil and natural gas projects as a foreign policy tool and to increase the leverage 
of the country in the international sphere (Aras, 2013 as cited in Aras, 2014, p. 2). This 
understanding coincided with the new Turkish foreign policy understanding which was being 
shaped by the ruling JDP government(s) because the party had a wider vision for Turkey also 
in the (South) Caucasus.  
Energy turned out to be one of the most significant aspects of this vision. As Kardaş 
(2011) asserts, making use of its geopolitical importance, Turkey has tried to move from a 
transit route to an ‘energy hub’ (p. 58). In this regard, Turkey focused on ‘[t]he transportation 
of the Caspian gas to the West’ (Görgülü & Krikorian, 2012, p. 2). This convergence between 
the Azeri demand for marketing its hydrocarbons to the Western market and having a say in 
the energy market (Aras, 2014), and the Turkish demand for playing the transit country to 
assume the role of an energy hub intensified the alliance forged between the two states. As 
Aras notes, regarding the energy-dictated side of the diplomatic ties between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, the two countries have so far been able to conclude two projects, the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline, while a major 
third project, the Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline, is under way (2014, p. 3-4). These 
developments were supported by the US and the EU to decrease the leverage of Moscow 
over the Caspian natural gas and oil (Balakishi, 2016, p. 13), and sealed the fact that energy-
based interests took the precedence over kinship-based interests. 
The mutual satisfaction between the Turkish and Azeri states vis-a-vis their respective 
energy policies has strengthened the relations between the two countries. Although Georgia 
also enjoys a certain level of profit, both in tangible and intangible means, Armenia is not 
part of any project, cementing the isolation of the country in the region. However, this proves 
to be an obstacle for the entire region. As Aras & Akpınar (2011, p. 59) stress, the internal 
economic problems of Armenians and the overreliance of Armenia on the ports of Georgia 
bombed during the Five-Day War4 between Georgia and Russia added and continue to add 
to the troubles Armenia is facing, deriving from its isolation in the region. Although the war 
                                                          
4 In this thesis, the terms Five-Day War and Russian-Georgian War (of 2008) are used interchangeably. 
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created a sudden impetus for Armenia to develop its relations with Turkey (Kakachia, 2011, 
p. 17), as we have already seen, the rapprochement process failed. This resulted in 
intensifying Russian involvement in the region on the side of Armenia, consolidating the 
status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, although the status quo does not 
contribute positively to the interests of either Armenia as it consolidates its isolation, or 
Azerbaijan as the status quo consolidates the occupation of its territories, neither Turkey and 
Armenia, or Armenia and Azerbaijan have been able to thaw their animosity which would 
lead to a breakthrough in the bilateral relations of these three countries along with the 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So why is this the case? 
Keeping in mind what we covered in the previous section, and the high compatibility 
of the Turkish-Azeri relations even in the absence of Armenia in the picture, we can find the 
answer to the question posed above. With regards to their relations with each other, in 
addition to the kin-based considerations, Turkey and Azerbaijan favour a more Realpolitik-
based understanding of international relations. For Azerbaijan, what is important is its 
economic improvement and its ascension to a powerful player through energy policies (Aras, 
2014). Similarly, for Turkey, it has been more crucial to obtain the energy hub status it has 
long sought to have and to keep the nationalist sentiments at home under control, than to 
normalise its relations with Armenia. Therefore, as Göksel (2011, p. 6) observes, the JDP has 
observed that the benefits of positive relations with Azerbaijan outweighed those of positive 
relations with Armenia. In addition to the interest-based considerations, there is also the role 
played by Russia in the conflict which is necessary to be touched upon because it illustrates 
the dynamics of the conflict while at the very same time revealing why and how Russian 
mediation attempts in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been successful. This is what we 
turn to now. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SECOND TRIANGLE: RUSSIA-ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN 
 
5.2. Russia and the South Caucasus 
Russia, ever since the Tsarist era, has been a dominant actor in the South Caucasus. As 
Rasizade illustrates, the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) helped the Tsarist regime incorporate 
the entire Transcaucasia into the empire for the first time (2011, p. 217). Following the treaty, 
the Russian hold in the region remained undisputed for nearly a century. In the early 1910s, 
the three states of the South Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, broke the Russian 
presence as they capitalised on the existing power vacuum in the region (Gafarlı et al., 2016, 
p. 3). Nevertheless, the sovereignty enjoyed by these three states turned out to be a short-
lived one as in the early 1920s, the Soviet Union incorporated all three South Caucasus states. 
This development is quite important because it laid the foundation for a near omnipotent 
Soviet, and hence Russian, presence in the region that created ‘the existing knowledge of the 
Russian elite on the Eurasian affairs, the sociocultural affinity with the region, its economic 
complementarity and political connections’ (Tüysüzoğlu, 2017, p. 187), which was utilised 
by Russia even after the USSR collapsed in the South Caucasus characterised by internal 
conflicts. This has had an impact on social, political and economic aspects of life in each 
South Caucasian state, mostly through the deliberate utilisation of their conflicts by Russia. 
To better understand this, and its implications for Armenia and Azerbaijan along with the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict itself, in what follows, I will first give a brief general outlook of 
the Russian presence in the South Caucasus and I will then discuss Russian-Armenian and 
Russian-Azerbaijani relations, with references to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The 
findings of this chapter, along with those of the previous one, will be evaluated and discussed 
in the next chapter of this thesis. 
Although Russia under the rule of Yeltsin was not capable of making Russia a global 
power, starting with the second half of the 1990s, especially after the coming to power of 
Putin, whose second term reinforced the nationalist interpretation of Russia’s role both in the 
world and the post-Soviet territory (Kuchins and Zevelev, 2012, p. 155; Abushov, 2009, pp. 
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190-191), Russia started to flourish in its post-Soviet area, including the South Caucasus. 
This was a result of the internal and regional dynamics taking place in the Russian Federation 
and the South Caucasus respectively. The Islamic insurgency in the North Caucasus – in 
Chechnya, and to a lesser extent in Dagestan – within the borders of the Russian Federation 
had caused serious injuries to the prospects of Russia assuming a regional, let alone global 
power (Baev, 2001, p. 2). To reverse this and having assumed there was a spill-over between 
the North and South Caucasus, and a support from the latter to the former to undermine 
Russia, Moscow decided to consolidate its grip on the former constituent states of the Soviet 
Union in its Southern Caucasus flank. Based on these considerations, Russia regarded the 
North and South Caucasus as one big ‘interlinked’ region (Trenin, 2009, p. 143), and did 
everything in its power to prevent any sort of instability, especially those stemming from 
conflicts, to damage its southern border (Abushov, 2009, p. 204) and interests in the South 
Caucasus. For example, the decision to invade Georgia to quell the Georgian attacks on the 
separatist regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia revealed how intent Russia was on maintaining 
its grip over this geography (Vosoghi, Emami, and Rostami, 2013, p. 470). 
To avoid such an instability, and to enjoy the power and privileges it assumed from the 
Soviet Union, Russia, rather than resorting to direct military force immediately, mostly 
manipulated the three countries of the South Caucasus, a region defined as ‘Russian exclusive 
sphere of influence’ (Hedenskog and Korkmaz, 2016, p. 2), an area of Russian ‘irrefutable 
influence’ (Cherniavskiy, 2010, p. 27) or Russian ‘near abroad’ (Abushov, 2009, p. 189). 
The easiest way to manipulate the countries constituting the South Caucasus region has been 
capitalising on the ‘frozen’ conflicts that determine the domestic and international affairs of 
the countries of the South Caucasus (Tüysüzoğlu, 2017; Gafarlı et al., 2016, p. 8). The 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russia’s stance on it should be examined within this context 
since the Russian stance on the conflict has so far been ‘controlled chaos’ (Valiyev, 2012, p. 
199), by which Russia used the conflict as a leverage to sustain its grasp over the South 
Caucasus. This, along with its general policies towards the conflicting parties enabled Russia 
to exert itself as the most important third party both as a destructive foe (mostly within the 
perception of the Azeri side) and a peace broker in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Nearly three years after the war over Nagorno-Karabakh turned into a bloody 
international war between two ex-Soviet countries, the Russian leadership of the time, despite 
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the apparent weaknesses of the state, was able to mediate the conflicting parties in 1994 
letting them reach a ceasefire which is still in place despite certain outbreaks of violence from 
time to time, which has created a tradition of Russian mediation in the conflict. Despite the 
establishment of the Minsk Group to mediate the conflict, it has always been Russia that has 
mediated the conflict. Russia has so far regarded itself as the sole mediator to the extent of, 
as de Waal reveals, exclusion of other potential peace brokers like Turkey from the peace 
process along with keeping the peace discussions confidential to other countries (2010a, p. 
173). This exclusion of certain players and their lack of information strengthened the Russian 
role as a mediator while hindering that of other potential mediators including Turkey. It 
should be noted here that this was a deliberate decision taken by the Russian state to increase 
its regional, and to a lesser extent, global power. The question to be posed here takes us back 
to the original research question that this thesis seeks to answer.  
While manipulating and shaping its policies towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
and to its main disputants, as we shall see in the remaining of this chapter, Russia has been a 
biased and partial party lacking neutrality. In fact, the policies of Moscow have made it 
involved directly in the conflict (Ismailzade, 2005, p. 104). Nevertheless, Russia has been 
and will keep being accepted as a mediator by both countries, a reality not applicable to 
Turkey. So, how has Russia been a mediator in the conflict despite its apparent bias and 
partiality? This chapter will help us answer this question. To do so, we should analyse the 
bilateral Russian-Armenian and Russian-Azerbaijani relations within the context of the 
conflict and the South Caucasus and discuss the findings in the following chapter. 
 
5.2. Russian-Armenian Relations 
As covered in the previous chapter, following its independence, Armenia aimed at 
following a neutral policy with a focus on improving its neighbourly relations. Nevertheless, 
due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, and the joint imposition of trade 
embargo and border closure on Armenia by Azerbaijan and its major ally Turkey, Armenia’s 
initial aims proved to be futile. This situation along with the realisation that Armenia’s 
geopolitical location hindered any prospect of it acting as a neutral state made Armenian 
policy makers turn back to Russia, which was consolidated with agreements on ‘economic, 
46 
 
political and military issues’ (Petros, 2003, p. 4). Russian-Armenian relations have been 
shaped predominantly by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, especially from the stance of 
Armenians: what Armenia needed was the preservation of the status quo in the conflict to 
keep the territorial gains intact, whereas Russia, as we have touched upon in the beginning 
of this chapter, wanted to keep its grasp over the South Caucasus. In this section, the author 
will lay down the major economic, political, military and social issues that stemmed from the 
respective needs of Armenia and Russia and that determined the course of bilateral relations 
between the two states, the findings of which will be utilised in the discussion chapter. 
Following the dissolution of the USSR, the closest relation that Russia established in 
the South Caucasus was that with Armenia which has been manifested with Armenia’s 
‘participation in all Russia-led post-Soviet integration projects’ such as ‘the CIS, CSTO, 
Eurasian Customs Union and EAEU’ (Gafarlı et al., 2016, p. 10). Although this trend initially 
emerged out of interdependent needs and interests of Russia and Armenia, within time, the 
bilateral relations between the two states turned into a Russian dominated zero-sum game.  
Since the initial need for Russia among Armenians originated from the latter’s security 
concerns following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as illustrated above, one of the earliest 
agreements concluded between the two states was a military agreement. In 1995, Armenia 
agreed to the establishment of the Russian 102nd military base to be stationed in Gyumri and 
the 3624th air base stationed in Erebuni (Arynbek, 2016, para 3). The 102nd military base 
turned out to be highly crucial in terms of meeting Armenia’s security needs because Gyumri 
is an Armenian town on the Armenian-Turkish border, and because the Turkish Third Field 
Army is present on the border and its ‘support to Azerbaijani military forces stationed in 
Nakhichevan’ means Turkey ‘could easily cut Armenia into two’ (Global Security, n.d., para 
10). Hence, the Russian military presence in the region serves the security needs of Armenia. 
This treaty was amended first in 2000 making it possible for Russia to station its 
military ‘in Armenia for 25 years (Hovhannisyan, 2011, p. 69), and then in 2010, after the 
2008 Five-Day War between Georgia and Russia, which extended the stay of the Russian 
military base until 2044 (Global Security, n.d., para 14). For the neighbours of Armenia, the 
concerning issue apart from the extension of Russian existence in the region with this treaty 
revision was that the revision brought about more responsibilities for Moscow (German, 
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2012, p. 218). As Valiyev points out, the Russian troops stationed in Gyumri will be 
responsible for protecting not only the Turkish-Armenian border but also the Armenian-
Azerbaijani border (2010, p. 3). Another important feature of this renewed treaty was the 
provision that required a mutual defence in the event of a military attack on either side 
(Hovhannisyan, 2011, p. 70). This is a quite crucial development because it implies that if 
the Azerbaijani government decides to use its military card to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, it may easily find itself fighting not just Armenian troops but also the Russian 
military. This provision consolidated the security needs of Armenia while cementing the 
power of Russia not only vis-à-vis Armenia itself but also vis-à-vis Azerbaijan because 
Russia emerged as a military threat once again. However, the consolidated Russian military 
presence in Armenia made Russia take the Armenian support for and dependency on Russia 
for granted (Giragosian, 2017), and led to the concerns that Armenia lost its independence 
becoming a Russian outpost in the South Caucasus (Minassian, 2008).  
It should be stated that such arguments are well-grounded. For example, following the 
outbreak of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016, Russia did not provide any military 
assistance to the Armenian side. This decision of Moscow not to get involved in the military 
confrontation which stemmed mostly from the fact that it did not know who initiated the 
conflict first (Korybko, 2017, para 5) brought about doubts in Yerevan pertaining to the 
reliability of Russia ‘as a close strategic partner’ (Balsyte, 2017, p. 1). In protest of this 
decision and in defiance of Russia, Armenia announced its plans to proceed with the 
Association Agreement with the European Union, which, however, was hampered by heavy 
Russian pressure (Korybko, 2017, para 9). Knowing, especially after the war in Georgia and 
because of the ‘Turkic’ threat on its two borders, that Moscow cannot be undermined, and it 
has nowhere to go, Yerevan followed suit and got back on its pro-Russian track, proving 
Giragosian, Minassian and other analysts/scholars with similar views correct. The outpost 
claims can easily be extended to the economic realm of Russian-Armenian relations as well. 
The closure of the Turkish-Armenian and the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders had a 
severe impact on the economic activities and capacity of the Armenian state. Armenia could 
not be involved in any ‘regional integration and cooperation projects’ bringing together other 
members of the South Caucasus community and Turkey, increasing Armenia’s ‘dependency 
on Russia’ (Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 41). With Turkey and Azerbaijan out of picture as 
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possible economic partners, Armenia had to rely solely on Georgia in the South Caucasus. 
Given that Georgia was not so well-advanced an economy to meet the needs of Armenia, 
Russia came to the fore in the economic sphere as well. There are certain aspects of Russian-
Armenian economic relations. 
One of them is related to security. As the Azerbaijani economy grew exponentially due 
to its high oil and natural gas reserves and utilised this growth to modernise its military and 
to increase its hard power vis-à-vis the Armenians, Armenia had to find a way of procuring 
weapons and armament. Russia provided and keeps providing weapons to Armenia. The 
positive aspect here is that since Armenia is a member of the CSTO unlike Azerbaijan, Russia 
has been selling weapons to Armenia at internal prices (Hovhannisyan, 2011, p. 70; 
Minassian, 2008, p. 11). Suffering from border closures and trade embargo, and the 
modernisation and consolidation of the Azerbaijani army, Armenia has no option but to buy 
Russian weapons due to its economic setbacks and the abovementioned pricing. 
Russian-Armenian economic relations involve another economic sphere as well. As 
Balakishi shows, ‘Russia is the biggest main foreign investor in Armenia and controls 
approximately one quarter of Armenian trade turnover’ (2016, p. 5). Russia invested more 
than $3 billion in Armenia in 2012 (Minasyan, 2013, p. 1). This is evident especially in the 
energy sector. There is a full dependency of Armenia on Russian oil and natural gas, and 
Russia is controlling crucial sectors of the Armenian economy such as ‘the transportation, 
telecommunications, banking and energy sector’ (Klever, 2013, p. 16). It is known that 
Russia has been using its energy card as a leverage towards many other countries in its near-
abroad to control the economy of such states (Kelkitli, 2008, p. 75). Yet, Armenia is the 
weakest country in this sense, and Russia knows and utilises this to increase its power in the 
region. To illustrate, Russia, with its economic and, specifically energy diplomacy, 
compelled Armenia to hand over the control of many of its most strategic sectors to Russia 
to compensate for its growing debt to Russia (Kelkitli, 2008, p. 86; Balakishi, 2016, p. 5). 
Although the expectation of Armenia is, and the norm should be, mutual dependency with 
Russia in economy, this is not a likely development given the current web of relationship and 
the status quo.  
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The relationship between the West and Armenia also adds to the status quo in Russian-
Armenian relations. Due to the border closure between Turkey and Armenia, it is not feasible 
to incorporate Armenia into Western markets. For example, in the early 1990s, three clothing 
factories, one of which was the world-famous Benetton, were opened in Yerevan yet they 
‘were forced to close soon after, since they were unable to receive necessary supply 
shipments’ (Goldenberg, 1994, p. 76 as cited in Petros, 2003, p. 11). In a similar vein, when 
asked if Armenia would ever conclude a free-trade agreement with Europe, Sargsyan told 
that such an agreement would not be lucrative because the Turkish-Armenian border is still 
closed (Hiatt, 2015, para 6). Hence, it is no surprise to see that Armenia intensified its 
economic relations with the Russian Federation which climaxed with the admission of 
Armenia to the Eurasian Economic Union.  
Before heading to analysing Russian-Azerbaijani relations, it should be made clear that 
the current state of affairs between Russians and Armenians is not likely to change either 
minimally or drastically. Armenia and Georgia were the only two countries in the South 
Caucasus that had a Russian military base. Following the Georgian-Russian war in 2008, 
Russia lost its military bases in Georgia, making Armenia provide Moscow with its only 
military base in the South Caucasus (Giragosian, 2017, para 5). Should Russian-Armenian 
relations deteriorate, Russia will no longer be able to maintain its ‘military and political 
presence in the South Caucasus’ (Minasyan, 2013, p. 4), something Moscow would not be 
willing to experience. However, the good news for the Russian policy makers is that 
Armenians do not have any substitute actor for Russia that would meet Armenian needs 
(Gafarlı et al., 2016, p. 11), and endanger the military presence of Russia in the region. 
 
5.3. Russian-Azerbaijani Relations 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been one of the major determinants of Russian-
Azerbaijani relations. This has been the case because (1) the primary objective of Azerbaijani 
foreign policy is the resolution of the conflict (Mammadov, 2015, p. 30), and (2) as 
Azerbaijan has been able to maintain a relatively independent foreign policy due to its energy 
reserves without being affected by Russian leverage over energy so much, Russia knows that 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ‘remains the only leverage that Russia can use against 
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Azerbaijan’ (Valiyev, 2011, p. 143). Since the status quo in the conflict does not favour the 
Azeri side, it is trying to do everything it can to change the status quo. Nevertheless, to 
maintain its grasp over Azerbaijan, Russia does not seem to be willing to resolve the conflict 
at all. The truth is Baku still sees Moscow as the key to reclaiming its lost territories. 
Similarly, to protect its ‘near abroad’, Moscow is not willing to lose Baku. In short, 
geopolitical considerations pertaining to their own interests have been shaping the relations 
between the two states. To better understand this web of relations between Russia and 
Azerbaijan, the author will lay down the interrelated role of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
of the Russian aggressiveness in the region that became visible after the Five-Day War in 
2008, and of energy in the bilateral relations of these two states. 
Although Azerbaijan initially expected a pro-Azerbaijani response from Russia to 
settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict when it erupted in terms acceptable to Baku, the fact 
that such a move never came from Moscow prompted Baku to move westward in its foreign 
policy (Cherniavskiy, 2010, pp. 27-28). Hence, the early years of Azerbaijan were shaped by 
an increasing anti-Russian attitude in Baku under the presidency of Elchibey. This policy 
was not welcomed by Moscow which ultimately led to the ousting of Elchibey and to the 
coming to power of the Aliyev family in 1994. To avoid such a fate in an environment where 
Moscow was highly hostile to Baku, the Aliyev government initiated a ‘balanced foreign 
policy’ (Aslanlı, 2010, p. 140), which aimed at approaching the West to the extent that it 
would not agitate Russia. The memories of the coup against Elchibey, and as we shall see in 
the remaining of this chapter the impact of Russian policies in the region first in 2008 in the 
Five-Day War with Georgia, and then in 2014 in Ukraine, tilted this ‘multi-vector approach 
between Russia and the western countries’ (Arynbek, 2016, para 2) towards Russia because 
of two considerations in Baku. The first is that Azerbaijan understands that its relations with 
Russia are of utmost importance when it comes to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. The second thing is that despite their interests in the region, the West, especially the 
US and the EU, have so far not acted in a way that would make Baku regard them as reliable 
as Russia in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or in the region as a whole. 
Let’s evaluate these two interrelated points in detail. 
The Five-Day War between Georgia and Russia revealed the volatility of stability in 
the region and ‘how dangerous an armed conflict may be in this region’ (Kakachia, 2011, p. 
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19). Azerbaijan drew a lesson for itself too. As Valiyev discusses, the major effect of the war 
on Azerbaijan has been that Baku has attempted to maintain a balance between its relations 
with Russia and its westward political interests (2010, p. 1). This was because the war, which 
showed the weaknesses of the West to confront Russia directly in the South Caucasus 
(Mikhelidze, 2010, p. 5), showed Azerbaijan that the West’s presence in the South Caucasus, 
especially vis-à-vis Russia, was more in rhetoric than in practice. The defeat of Georgia, a 
US ally in the region, helped Russia send the message that the US should not be deemed as 
the ultimate protector for the post-Soviet states, deteriorating the image of the US (Trenin, 
2009, p. 148), which was a successful move. It is a known fact that in geopolitically important 
regions like the South Caucasus, actions are deemed more crucial than words. Hence, 
Azerbaijan realised that relations with Russia would be taken seriously not to agitate Moscow 
to the extent of military invasion of the Azerbaijani soil by Russia in support of Armenia, 
which the recent war in Georgia had revealed was highly possible. Despite, the Azeri views 
of apparent Russian bias towards Armenia, Baku attempted to improve its relations with 
Baku for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The declaration signed between 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia regarding the dedication to the peaceful means for the 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict right after the Five-Day War is an indicator of 
this attempt. To better understand the impact of the war and the successive developments, 
one can look at the fact that Mammadyarov, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, stated that a 
primary objective of Azerbaijani foreign policy in 2011 would be improving the bilateral 
relations with neighbours, specifically Moscow (German, 2012, p. 221). 
The Georgian-Russian war taught Baku another lesson that had an impact on Russian-
Azerbaijani relations: the US and the EU cannot be blindly trusted within the realities of the 
South Caucasus. In fact, the rift between Azerbaijan and the US can be traced back to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict itself without even discussing the Five-Day War. Azeris contend 
that Washington shies away from utilising its leverage over Armenians to help Baku reclaim 
its occupied territories (Mammadov, 2015, p. 32). This, along with the apparent ‘lack of long 
term commitment by the international community’ (Klever, 2013, p. 2) apart from Russia 
had already contributed to an understanding among Azeris that Russia would be the key to 
any resolution regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The war just intensified this 
understanding.  
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A similar case can be made for the relations between the EU and Azerbaijan. Suffering 
from the conflict for more than two decades, Baku knows relying on Russia would be a better 
and possibly quicker option than turning its eyes to the EU. While the EU emphasises 
increasing the capacity of civil society along with improving democracy and human rights 
records, Azerbaijan envisages ‘a strategic relationship based on mutual interests and 
objectives’ (Mammadov, 2015, p. 33), that would help Baku resolve the conflict in terms 
acceptable to Azeris. Given that the relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan rests on a 
‘pragmatic, business-like, and mutually advantageous’ paradigm with a focus on mutual 
satisfaction of objectives (Cherniavskiy, 2010, p. 35), which is more advantageous for a 
quicker resolution of the conflict, why Azerbaijan has recently favoured Russia over the EU 
can be better understood. This “business-like” relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan is 
crucial to analyse because it is related to another major aspect of the relations between these 
two states: energy reserves and energy policies of Russia and Azerbaijan. 
Contrary to Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijan has vast energy reserves which have 
increased the significance attached to Azerbaijan by regional and global powers. The natural 
gas Azerbaijan extracts from its sector in the Caspian Sea has boosted its economy, which 
was mostly used in increasing the country’s military power which consolidated the security 
dilemma in the region. Additionally, the energy reserves consolidated the independent nature 
of the Azerbaijani energy policies which became evident especially after the completion of 
the South Caucasus pipeline (Kjærnet, 2009, p. 3), in a severe contrast to Armenia. Therefore, 
energy, one of the biggest Russian tools to be used while formulating foreign policy, does 
not have a leverage, or to be more correct a leverage as strong as the one on Armenia, on 
Azerbaijan.  
The actions of Russia in the region, especially during the Five-Day War, had direct 
implications for Russian-Azerbaijani relations in general and the energy policies the two 
sides followed in specific. First and foremost, the war revealed to Baku that Moscow 
possessed leverages, albeit limited and indirect, in the energy zone over Baku. The war 
showed that ‘the integrity of the oil and gas corridor depended simply on Russian good will’ 
(Blagovi 2008 as cited in Kakachia, 2011, p. 17). Hence, even if Azerbaijan feels like it can 
antagonise Russia while formulating its foreign policy and energy policy, the proven 
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possibility of Russian destructiveness would prevent Baku from taking such a stand towards 
Moscow. There are two further (and softer) reasons why this is the case. 
The first reason is that Azerbaijan is well aware of the way Russia approaches the post-
Soviet area. To maintain its power and hold in the region, Russia will not back away from 
taking unilateral steps. The actions in Georgia in 2008, and most recently in Ukraine which 
led to the annexation of Crimea revealed that Russia favoured a more active approach based 
on concrete actions than a passive one based on mere rhetoric (Tüysüzoğlu, 2017, p. 192), in 
a severe contrast to the actions of the West. As we have so far seen, such an understanding 
in Moscow’s approach to the post-Soviet region had potential ramifications for the fate of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Given that Armenia is the bastion of Russia’s vested interests in the 
South Caucasus that Russia will not forgo (Ismailzade, 2005, p. 105), for Azerbaijan, 
antagonising Russia through energy policies developed with and for the West would be 
tantamount to inviting Russian aggression towards Baku. Following the annexation of 
Crimea, Baku realised that as Russia is game-setter in the South Caucasus, a military option 
in order to retake Nagorno-Karabakh would be viable as long as Russia approves it 
(Ismayilov and Zasztowt, 2015, p. 4). Additionally, in line with the argument above, that the 
US and the EU imposed sanctions on Moscow following the annexation of Crimea while not 
having done the same thing against Armenia led to negative attitudes towards the West 
among Azerbaijani people (Mammadov, 2015, p. 35), leading to conclusions that Azerbaijan 
was doomed to be left on its own against Armenia and its patron Russia. To avoid such a 
bleak scenario, Azerbaijan moved to converge its energy interests with Russia because 
energy is the most significant aspect of Russia’s global and regional power. 
The second reason is related to the energy policies of Russia itself, which are capable 
of undermining those of Azerbaijan. To reduce the prospects of the realisation of the Nabucco 
or similar projects endorsed by Azerbaijan, Russia proposed the Turkish Stream project 
which would undermine Azerbaijan as the proposed project will eliminate the need for 
Azerbaijani gas in Western markets (Ismayilov and Zasztowt, 2015, p. 3). If the project 
concludes as envisaged, it will bring about a decrease in gas exports from Azerbaijan to 
Europe which will have the double impact of intensifying Baku’s economic crisis and 
rendering the Azeri government fragile against the domestic ‘unrest’ (Ramani, 2016, para 8). 
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Therefore, although not as severely dependent on Russian energy policy as Armenia, 
Azerbaijan can also fall prey to Russian leverage in energy.  
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the policies of Russia towards the conflict and the 
South Caucasus countries have so far determined the course of Russian-Azerbaijani relations. 
That Russian-Armenian ties became highly strong and consolidated following the signing of 
and revisions to military agreements between the two states, and the apparent Russian 
destructiveness as exemplified by Moscow’s actions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 
along with the inaction of the West towards the region made Baku conclude that its bilateral 
relations with Russia are of utmost importance in the region when it comes to the resolution 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the realisation of other Azerbaijani goals in political 
and economic spheres. However, since Russia is seemingly more inclined towards making 
use of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for its own interests rather than resolving it, which will 
make the conflict occupy a significant place in Azeri foreign policy, Russian-Azerbaijani 
relations will likely remain the same. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF RESOURCES IN DETERMINING SUCCESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION  
 
As we have already covered in the preceding two chapters, neither Turkey nor Russia 
is an unbiased, impartial and neutral actor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, while 
Turkish mediation attempts towards the conflict have not been accepted leading to mediation 
failures, those of Russia have been accepted by both disputants leading to the first pillar of 
mediation success. In this chapter, under the light of the findings of the preceding chapters, 
the author will discuss the impact of resources a mediator possesses rather than that of 
mediator’s being impartial, unbiased and neutral on mediation outcomes – success or failure 
–  to test the main argument of this study as stated in the introduction chapter of this thesis. 
While analysing the role of resources, the author will refer to the ‘six bases of power’ concept 
of Jeffrey Rubin (1992).  
 
6.1. Criterion 1: Reward Power 
Rubin states that ‘[r]eward power is used when the influencer offers some positive 
benefit in exchange for compliance’ (1992, p. 255). What this statement means, in the context 
of international mediation, is that if there is a potential to be rewarded in the case of accepting 
a mediation offer, then conflicting sides will opt for accepting the offer, resulting in a 
successful mediation, the first pillar of it, as defined in this thesis.  
When we examine the relations of Russia with the disputants in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, we see this power in action. Russia, knowing that Armenia is locked in its 
environment by two allies, is able to offer security to Armenia and the maintenance of the 
status quo in the conflict which Armenia favours. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, due to its increasing energy capacity which leads to a bigger gross national income, 
Azerbaijan has bought high capacity weapons and increased its military capacity vis-à-vis 
Armenia. To mitigate the impact of this on Armenia, Russia has been providing Armenia 
with weapons at much lower prices especially because Armenia is a member of each Russian-
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led alliance, both military and economic. These low prices represent another Russian reward 
for Armenia. Such a low pricing has also been the case in the supply of natural gas and oil 
from Russia to Armenia. This situation will remain the same as long as Armenia complies 
with Russia. Hence, the reward power, especially through the implications of the continuation 
of these rewards, explains why Armenians choose to comply with Russia in every single area, 
including Russian mediation offers in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Despite its inclination towards Armenia, Russia has been accepted as a mediator to the 
conflict by Azerbaijan as well, a situation part of which can be explained by the reward 
power. We know that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is used by the Azerbaijani elite to quell 
the growing domestic unrest and demands for more democracy. The Russian arms sale to 
Azerbaijan has enabled the Aliyev government to have slight military victories to help the 
government use the “rally-around-the-flag” sentiments among the Azerbaijani public 
(Ramani, 2016, para 12). Given that there is an arms sale embargo on Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and Russia is the biggest country that breaks it, the arms sale coming from 
Moscow that helps Baku appease its domestic unrest and maintain a certain level of military 
might is a positive outcome of compliance between Moscow and Baku that the latter cannot 
give up. Moreover, even though Azerbaijan is not dependent on Russian energy as much as 
Armenia is, there is still a certain amount of dependency. As the developments following the 
Russian-Georgian War in 2008 have revealed, the pipeline projects between Azerbaijan and 
Europe, and the safety of pipelines in general can be interrupted by Russia because ‘the 
integrity of the oil and gas corridor depended simply on Russian good will’ (Blagov, 2008 as 
cited in Kakachia, 2011, p. 17). To defuse this danger, Baku knows that it should comply 
with Russia. Given that its energy reserves constitute the most important leverage over 
Armenia, Azerbaijan cannot jeopardise the continuation and safety of its energy exports, 
which are receptive to Russian threat. Additionally, as we have revealed in the previous 
chapter, the annexation of Crimea by Russia helped Azerbaijan realise that if it moves closer 
to and cooperates with Russia, it can create a possible Russian consent to gain the territories 
it lost during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Ismayilov and Zasztowt, 2015, p. 4). What this 
means is that as Russia is likely to offer such a territorial reward, cooperating with rather than 
antagonising Russia is crucial for Azerbaijan, which has a direct implication for the 
acceptance of Russian mediation offers as well. 
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When we examine the position of Turkey within this power, what we see is that Turkey 
does not possess reward power as Russia does. Turkey, within its current state of affairs with 
Armenia, is not able to offer any reward for Armenian compliance. In fact, the status quo in 
Turkish-Armenian relations hampers any prospect of Turkey rewarding Armenia in military, 
economic, political or social ways. The level of animosity between Turks and Armenians 
makes it difficult for the Turkish state to cooperate with Armenia or reward it in return for 
compliance. Additionally, that the borders are closed, and Turkey has been imposing a trade 
embargo on Armenia have so far alienated Armenia from Turkey. These issues along with 
the perceived military threat from Turkey among Armenians made Yerevan move further 
eastward towards Moscow (German, 2012, p. 222), which rewards Armenia with further 
security. Unless Turkey changes its policies towards Armenia, it will not able to make use of 
reward power. Therefore, with regards to reward power, Armenia does not have any incentive 
to comply with Turkey, and/or in our case, accept its mediation offers. 
Turkey’s reward power vis-à-vis Azerbaijan does exist, albeit in a weak form. Turkey 
borders Azerbaijan only through its autonomous region, Nakhichevan. Turkey, by the virtue 
of the Kars Treaty of 1921, is the guarantor of the security and independence of this 
autonomous region (Rasizade, 2011, p. 222). This protection constitutes one pillar of 
Turkey’s reward power towards Azerbaijan because, for Baku, good relations with Ankara 
translate into the protection of Baku’s exclave. The other pillar is related to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Turkey has advocated for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and 
promoted the Azeri view on the conflict at the international level (Cornell, 1998, p. 51). If 
this support ceases to be delivered, Azerbaijan will be on its own in defending its own rhetoric 
regarding the conflict. Turkey also signed certain agreements to modernise and train the Azeri 
military. However, since Russia is the main weapon supplier to Azerbaijan, the Russian 
reward has been more crucial than this Turkish reward given the dynamics of the region and 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, shaped by hard power considerations. Additionally, as 
mediation is deemed successful, its first pillar, only when both parties to the conflict accept 
a mediation offer, that Turkey has a limited reward power only towards Azerbaijan will not 
positively affect the prospects of future mediation attempts by Turkey. 
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6.2. Criterion 2: Coercive Power 
As Rubin explains, in line with ‘the language of threat’, coercive power refers to ‘the 
threat to impose one of ant of a number of possible punishments unless compliance results’ 
(1992, p. 255). What the coercive power means, in the context of international mediation, is 
that if the disputants know that there will be possible severe punishments if they reject 
compliance, or a mediation offer in our case, they will be likely to comply with the third 
party, or accept its mediation offer to avoid such a fate.  
As we have observed in the chapter dedicated to the bilateral relations Russia has 
formed with Armenia and Azerbaijan, one important feature of the Russian approach towards 
the two counties has been the focus on not losing and consolidating the power Moscow has 
over the post-Soviet zone. Seeing the post-Soviet countries within its sphere of influence, 
Russia will not tolerate any attempt by any post-Soviet state to endanger this position of 
Russia through cementing ties with the West, specifically the US and the EU. Although 
neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan have gone through any experience similar to those Georgia 
and Ukraine had, the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia, and the Russian policies 
towards Ukraine leading to the annexation of Crimea by Russia have been enough to send 
signals of caution to Yerevan and Baku. Therefore, following the developments in Georgia 
and Ukraine, Russian coercion is likely to be taken into consideration by both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. For instance, with regards to the former development, the 2008 declaration 
signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation on the peaceful resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the biggest examples of how Russia’s coercive power 
works because through this declaration both disputants stressed the importance of a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict to avoid the fate of Georgia. To better understand this situation, it 
is necessary to examine Russia’s coercive power towards the two disputants separately.  
For Armenia, the possibility of Russian invasion is politically and geographically less 
likely but still feasible. As we have already noted in the previous chapter, Armenia is the only 
country that has Russian military bases with thousands of soldiers. Therefore, despite being 
an unlikely event due to the circumstances Armenia and Russia find themselves in within the 
geopolitical considerations of the South Caucasus, if Armenia chooses to turn its eyes strictly 
to the West, or to decline any offer by Russia that may antagonise Russia and undermine 
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Russian interests, Russia will be able to inflict military pain on Armenia. In a similar vein, 
as Russia rewards Armenia with a sense of security, the same Russia, when its interests are 
deliberately ignored by Armenia, can step away from protecting Armenia, which would have 
severe repercussions for Armenians’ security concerns. Additionally, as we have discussed 
extensively in the previous chapter, Russia is the major and nearly sole trading partner of 
Armenia. In the case of a Russian economic embargo, Armenia knows that it has nowhere to 
go. As a result, Russian coercion – both explicit and implicit – is highly felt by the policy 
makers in Yerevan, which has a natural impact on the considerations by Armenians regarding 
Russian mediation offers. 
A similar case can be made for Azerbaijan as well. It is true that Azerbaijan, mostly 
thanks to its energy reserves in the Caspian Sea, has been enjoying a more independent and 
balanced foreign policy towards Russia than Armenia. Nonetheless, the Five-Day War made 
it obvious that Russia is the country to be reckoned with in the South Caucasus because any 
rhetoric of support coming from the West will not yield any tangible results as long as it fails 
to be taken into practice. This is why, after the war, Baku attempted to strengthen its relations 
with Moscow because a military confrontation with Russia would wreak havoc on the energy 
sector of Azerbaijan, crippling the most important leg of the Azerbaijani economy and 
jeopardising the Azeri position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Also, the Russian military 
presence in Armenia and Azerbaijan’s border with Russia make it easy for Russian troops to 
invade Azerbaijan if there need be, and to end the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict militarily in 
terms acceptable only to Armenia, which became more evident after the revision of the 
military alliance between Russia and Armenia in 2010. Thus, Baku understood that it would 
be difficult for it to retake Nagorno-Karabakh through military means because of the Russian 
deterrence (Ismayilov and Zasztowt, 2015, p. 4) and favoured a visibly pro-Russian foreign 
policy to induce Moscow to resolve the conflict peacefully and in line with the regulations 
of international law, which would better fit to Azeris’ point of view regarding the conflict. 
The implications of the previous Russian aggression in the region, consolidating Russia’s 
coercive power, are so effective that even though Russia did not support Armenia in the 
violent clashes in April 2016, in defiance of the military agreement between the two sides, 
Azerbaijan still is cautious towards Russia because Russia’s inaction in April 2016 cannot be 
seen as a total inaction among Azeris. As the resolution of the conflict is the prime foreign 
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policy objective of Azerbaijan (Mammadov, 2015, p. 30), Russian coercion is an important 
factor for Azerbaijan making it accept Russian mediation as a reliable tool to manage the 
conflict.  
Turkey is a militarily and politically powerful country when compared to both 
disputants which implies that Turkey can utilise coercive power. However, it is limited by 
the realities of the South Caucasus. It can easily be claimed that Turkey, a militarily strong 
country, can inflict military defeat on Armenia. In fact, in the early 1990s, when the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict turned into an international war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in 
support of its ethnic-kin in the South Caucasus, Turkey threatened to carry out a military 
intervention in Armenia (Cornell, 1998, p. 61). Although these threats were not realised, 
knowing that Armenia would be overrun by Turkey, Yerevan and Moscow concluded the 
military treaty that established the Russian military bases in Gyumri on the Turkish-
Armenian border (Global Security, n.d., para 10). Therefore, the possibility of a Turkish 
threat in the form of a military invasion was defused by this treaty. Additionally, unlike 
Russia, Turkey does not have an economic coercive leverage over Armenia. The borders are 
already closed and there is a trade embargo imposed by Turkey on Armenia. Closed borders 
cannot be closed further and an already imposed embargo cannot be imposed again. Hence, 
Armenia is not in a position to be (further) threatened by Turkey economically because there 
is no economic activity taking place between the two sides. What these two factors mean is 
that from a ‘coercive power’-based consideration, Armenia does not have any incentives to 
comply with Turkey because the status quo does not allow Turkey to coerce Armenia either 
militarily or economically. 
Turkish coercive power towards Azerbaijan is even weaker. As has already been 
discussed in the chapter on the bilateral relations between Turkey and the disputants, one of 
the pillars of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations has been the shared ethnicity between the two 
states. At the societal and to a slightly lesser extent at the state levels, the two nations have 
enjoyed a very positive relationship that is hard to be broken easily. Therefore, it is not likely 
for Turkey to threaten its ‘brethren’ in Azerbaijan because there would be a public backlash 
against it. In fact, as we observed during the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, the highly 
positive relations between Turks and Azeris coupled with the hostility of these two publics 
towards Armenians derailed the rapprochement process, further consolidating the ties 
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between Turks and Azeris. Given this, it is not likely to see Turkey using the language of 
threat against Azerbaijan. Moreover, one of the major tenets of the current Turkish foreign 
policy has been making Turkey an energy hub (Kardaş, 2011, p. 58). As a result, it is 
somehow compulsory for Turkey to maintain positive relations with any energy producing 
country like Azerbaijan if it wants to realise this objective. In fact, this consideration, 
surfaced when Baku took steps against the energy deals between Turkey and Azerbaijan, was 
the other reason why the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement ended. What this illustrates is 
that, the language of threat utilised by Baku over Ankara has been an efficient leverage 
although for a successful mediation by Turkey in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the exact 
opposite should be the case. Thus, in the realm of energy which is the most crucial aspect of 
the bilateral relations between the two states, there is no possibility of Turkish coercive power 
towards Azerbaijan. 
 
6.3. Criterion 3: Legitimate Power 
Rubin defines legitimate power as a form of resource that ‘requires the influencer (the 
mediator) to persuade on the basis of having the right to make a request’ (1992, p. 255). 
While analysing this base of power, what we have to stress is that legitimate power has a role 
to play, though it is a limited one in scope and effect. This is mostly because in the 
international system, each potential mediator has to use the legality of their proposed 
intervention for the purpose of justifying their actions (Rubin, 1992, p. 269). Additionally, as 
we have discussed earlier in this thesis, the interest in managing a conflict renders the offered 
actions of third parties legitimate (Bercovitch, 1996, p. 3; Zartman and Touval, 1996, p. 446). 
Therefore, legitimate power, from the perspective of mediators, is a given and cannot 
determine the likelihood of success or failure on its own when the focus is on the 
characteristic of the mediators because every mediator will claim that it is following a 
legitimate course. This is why the author of this thesis contends that out of the six bases of 
power a mediator might possess, legitimate power is the weakest one, making it possible to 
disregard it from Rubin’s concept entirely. 
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6.4. Criteria 4 and 5: Expert Power and Informational Power 
These two criteria will be analysed together because the informational power is an 
extension of the expert power. Therefore, it is useful to first define the two forms of power, 
and then analyse them in the cases of Russian and Turkish mediation vis-à-vis the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Rubin sees the expert power as a power that ‘relies for its effectiveness 
on the influencer’s ability to create the impression of being in a possession of some body of 
information or expertise that justifies a particular request’ (1992, p. 255). As an extension of 
the expert power, the informational power is about what the ‘information’ that the mediator 
argues that it possesses entails and if such an information is made known to the disputants 
(Rubin, 1992, p. 255). In other words, the informational power is somehow the realisation of 
and measured by the reliability of the expert power. 
As we have already discussed in the previous chapter, Russia, because of the 
domination of the South Caucasus by the Soviet Union, has a deep understanding of and 
knowledge about the problems and issues in the post-Soviet area (Tüysüzoğlu, 2017, p. 187), 
especially regarding the conflicts that erupted during the Soviet times. This was one of the 
reasons why Russia was able to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1994, which 
created a tradition of Russian mediation in the conflict. Relying on its expert power, in 1994, 
Russia was able to manage the conflict proving the reliability of the expertise it possesses, 
an example of the informational power. Because of this initial success, coupled with the 
understanding that Russia defines the rules in the post-Soviet area (Ismayilov and Zasztowt, 
2015, p. 4) and the fact that both Armenia (Petros, 2003, p. 1) and Azerbaijan (Gafarlı et al., 
2016, p. 10) have strong political and economic ties with Moscow, increasing the expertise 
of the Russian ruling elite with the domestic affairs of the two disputants, the success of 
Russian mediation, as defined in this thesis as the first pillar of mediation success, has been 
the norm in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.      
When we examine the Turkish mediation attempts in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
the scenario is the exact opposite. During the Soviet period, the point of contact for 
international actors had been Moscow because the constituent states of the Soviet Union had 
to rely on Moscow as the constituent states were not able to conduct their own independent 
foreign policy. Thus, Turkey lacked required contacts with both Armenia and Azerbaijan that 
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would provide itself with the necessary information that could have been and can be utilised 
while offering mediation services. Additionally, as the 1990s proved to be near-disastrous 
for Turkey in terms of political and economic stability (see Uzer, 2012, p. 248; Aras & 
Akpınar, 2011, p. 54; Kirişçi and Moffatt, 2015, p. 71), Turkey was not able to focus its 
whole attention on the newly independent states (both Turkic and non-Turkic) that emerged 
from the Soviet Union following its dissolution in 1991. Moreover, as we have covered in 
the previous chapter, the sole Russian mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that 
neglects and even ignores other actors, curbed the ability of other potential actors to develop 
expertise regarding the conflict itself and the conflicting parties (de Waal, 2010, p. 173). 
Here, we can refer to the issue we covered in the chapter dedicated to the bilateral relations 
of Turkey with the conflicting parties again. As we have suggested in that chapter, one of the 
reasons why Turkey, during its rapprochement with Armenia, disregarded the link between 
Turkish-Armenian relations and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – a stance 
it has long advocated for – was that Ankara ‘believed that progress on Armenia-Azerbaijan 
dispute was more advanced than it actually was’ (de Waal, 2010, p. 173). This proves the 
point that unlike Russia, Turkey does not possess the expertise power, hence the 
informational power as the latter form of power is an extension of the former. This partly 
explains why Turkish mediation attempts in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been futile 
so far. 
 
6.5. Criterion 6: Referent Power 
Rubin defines the referent power in line with the relationship the mediator and the 
disputants have by saying that ‘the influencer (the mediator) counts on the fact that the 
recipient (the disputant) in some way values his or her relationship with the source of 
influence’ (1992, p. 256). The major component of this power is the existence, and value 
thereof, of relationship between the mediator and the disputant. Additionally, as stated earlier 
in this thesis, using a literal approach to the word, while discussing the referent power, the 
author of this thesis evaluates the idea of referring the disputant to mediation, which is often 
defined as delivery, as another component of the referent power. Let us examine these two 
components in the Russian and Turkish cases separately. 
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Russia, for nearly two centuries, has been the dominant actor in the Caucasus, both 
North and South. Therefore, it was able to cement a strong relationship between the Russians 
and the peoples of the Caucasus. The relationship had many pillars at the economic, political, 
social and military levels. The economic, political and military pillars, related to Russian hard 
power, have so far been more significant than the social pillar of the relationship, based on 
Russian soft power. This has been the case for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
For Armenians, Russia is the major partner in every area. The relationship between the 
two is defined by the strategic goals each party seeks (Minasyan, 2013, p. 5; Vosoghi, Emami 
and Rostami, 2013). Russia provides security to Armenia and it is also the major trading 
country in Armenia which helps ease the isolation of the country in the region (Gamaghelyan, 
2010, p. 45). Armenia has been the only country in the South Caucasus that has served the 
interests of Russia without creating any obstacles. Given that its ties with Georgia and Iran 
are relatively fragile, and Turkey and Azerbaijan keep excluding and isolating it 
economically and politically, Armenia is not in a position to jeopardise its relations with 
Russia, which Moscow knows, and even manipulates, very well. 
Russia is a significant partner for Azeris as well. Azerbaijan is well aware of the fact 
that Russia is the major player in the South Caucasus. Russia has been the major trade partner 
of Azerbaijan both in energy and non-energy sectors, being the ‘number one trade partner in 
the non-oil sector’ (Mammadov, 2015, p. 34). Similarly, as we have already covered, there 
is a continuing military relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia. Politically speaking, the 
Azeri ruling elite is very close to the Russian ruling elite, a relationship that is highly 
consolidated and that dates back to the Soviet era. Therefore, for Azerbaijan, its relations 
with Russia are quite crucial not to be forsaken. The actions of Russia in Georgia and Ukraine 
are quite telling in this case. They showed what would happen to those states that disregard 
their relationship with Moscow and rely on a Western orientation (Kakachia, 2011, p. 19). 
As a result of these realities and considerations, and because of the historical presence of 
Russia in the region which dictates the developments in the region, maintaining relations with 
Russia has been a major task for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. That is why, in addition to 
the previous powers (or criteria), Russia is able to rely on the referent power both as defined 
by Rubin, and in the sense that Russia can refer disputants to the negotiations (delivery) as 
the author of this thesis added to the referent power. 
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Turkey, through its Ottoman background, has been in the Caucasus earlier than the 
Russian Empire was. However, the developments during and following the First World War 
created obstacles for Turkey in the South Caucasus, especially for Turkey’s bilateral relations 
with Armenia. Mostly due to the clashing views on what happened in 1915 to the Ottoman 
Armenians and how to define the incident, Turkish-Armenian relations have been cold, and 
in fact non-existent. As we discussed in the chapter on the bilateral relations between Turkey 
and the disputants, although the initial period following the independence of Armenia turned 
out to carry a potential for developing positive relations between Turks and Armenians, this 
was a short-lived period, with the impact of the Armenian Diaspora which had its toll also in 
the latest round of rapprochement between the two countries. Currently, there are no 
diplomatic, military, humanitarian or economic relations between the two sides. As a result, 
there is no relationship that Armenia (the recipient) will value while making its decision 
towards the mediation offer of Turkey (the influencer). 
The fate Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have experienced is quite opposite to the one 
experienced by Turkish-Armenian relations. The two sides are so close to each other that 
there are those in both countries that refer to the old rhetoric of ‘one nation, two states’ 
underlying the shared ethnicity and culture of the peoples of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Turkey, 
as already been stated, is the major supporter of the Azeri point of view regarding the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and is an important partner in political, economic and military 
terms. Although the relationship between the two nations and states is quite strong, the 
Turkish attempt to bridge Ankara and Yerevan between 2008-2010 without involving Baku 
in the process negatively affected Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, leading to declining trust 
from Azerbaijan towards Turkey (Uzer, 2012, pp. 246-247). Additionally, the business-like 
approach of the Aliyev government to Azerbaijani foreign policy renders Turkish-
Azerbaijani relations receptive to further injuries because Azerbaijan does not shy away from 
manipulating the energy needs of Turkey as a leverage. Hence, there is a relationship that 
Azerbaijan, as the recipient, will take into account while dealing with Turkish mediation 
attempt; however, the relationship is not as strong as it was. Based on the referent power 
criterion and the previous criteria, it can be stated that while Turkey cannot exert the referent 
power as defined by Rubin and in line with the idea of delivery on Armenia, it can do so, 
though in a limited fashion, on Azerbaijan. However, as we also suggested while discussing 
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reward power, what we know by now is that mediation is successful when its accepted by 
disputants, and a mediation is deemed to be accepted only when both sides accept an offer. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, through a case study, the author has attempted to develop an approach to 
mediation success and understand the basic determinant(s) of success and failure in 
international mediation and to test the main argument stated in the introduction chapter. As 
the term success has been used in line with and with an alteration to the definition of Frei 
(1976), the major focus in this endeavour has been the acceptance and/or rejection of 
mediation offers as the measure of success and failure, or the first pillar of mediation success. 
As outlined earlier in this thesis, ‘the characteristics of mediators’ and ‘the relations 
between mediators and the disputants’, as suggested by Frei (1976), have been main pillars 
that the main argument and this study rest on. As the main argument suggested that ‘the more 
resourceful a mediator is, the more likely its mediation efforts will be accepted/successful in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’, the most important characteristic of a mediator regarding 
the first pillar of success in international mediation has been seen as resourcefulness. This is 
because, in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, both approaches to mediation are observed -
Russia sees mediation as a foreign policy tool in the conflict whereas Turkey has sincere 
intentions to resolve the conflict, and Russia is accepted as a mediator to the conflict unlike 
Turkey. The major difference between the two parties is not related to bias but to leverages. 
While analysing this and testing the main argument, the author relied on the ‘six bases of 
power’ concept developed by Rubin (1992), while scrutinising the merits of this concept at 
the very same time. 
To be able to come to a point where such an analysis would be conducted, the author 
first touched upon the major theoretical discussions in international mediation. The author 
then shed light on the case in question, the actors of the case and the relations between the 
actors in three subsequent chapters. The first of these three chapters provided a general 
picture of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from a historical perspective whereas the second 
and third ones dwelled on Turkey’s relations with the disputants and Russia’s relations with 
the disputants respectively. The findings of this endeavour are as follows. 
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The findings from the previous chapters support the argument that both Turkey and 
Russia are biased and partial actors lacking neutrality towards the disputants, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. However, while Turkish mediation attempts have so far been characterised by 
failure, those of Russia have been successful which makes it necessary to find an answer to 
the question of mediation acceptance (the first pillar of mediation success) beside the 
argument that if a mediator is biased, unneutral and partial, its mediation offers will not be 
accepted. The proposed answer that was supported by this thesis and other academic works 
has been that the key to success in international mediation, especially in protracted 
international, intercultural and interethnic conflicts, is to be in possession of certain 
leverages, which have been examined via the arguments of Rubin (1992) in this study, which 
constitutes the backbone of the main argument that the author of this work put forth in the 
Introduction chapter.  
The findings of this thesis support the main argument because they prove that despite 
the apparent bias, lack of neutrality and impartiality, since Russia, compared to Turkey, has 
more resources – as categorised and discussed with regards to the ‘six bases of power’ 
concept of Rubin (1992), Armenia and Azerbaijan have so far both accepted the mediation 
offers coming from Russia. In other words, it is not the Russian impartiality or neutrality that 
helped Russia get accepted as the mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, meeting the 
first requirement of mediation success, but it was Russia’s resourcefulness despite its visibly 
biased and partial characteristics in favour of Armenia that made Russia an acceptable 
mediator to both disputants involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In line with the 
previous argument, the reason why Turkish mediation attempts in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict have so far failed should be explained through its lack of required resources rather 
than its apparent bias and partiality in favour of Azerbaijan.  
In fact, as Kocadal (2016), in his study on Turkish mediation in the Cyprus conflict, 
reveals, kin-mediation can prove to be a reliable and working phenomenon. Therefore, a bias 
coming mostly from a shared ethnicity, that of Turkey in this study, does not necessarily 
hamper the likelihood of the first pillar of mediation success as long as there are resources 
available to mediators that can be utilised towards both disputants properly. However, if a 
mediator, no matter who or what, is unbiased, neutral and impartial but still lacking resources 
(or leverages), then that mediator’s mediation attempts will not be likely to succeed, or such 
69 
 
characteristics will not create a specific impetus among disputants for positively considering 
the mediation offers of that mediator. 
The findings of this thesis have two important implications. The first one is for policy-
making chambers, especially for those in Turkey. There are certain recommendations that 
the author of this thesis has derived from the findings of this work. If Turkey wants to be a 
successful mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, then it should increase its reach to 
both disputants. As we have discussed, there are no relations between Armenia and Turkey 
at the moment, reducing the referent power of Turkey in the conflict. Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance for Ankara to first restart and then develop its relations with Yerevan (Welt, 
2013) because developing relations with Armenia will increase Turkey’s resources vis-à-vis 
Armenia which can be used by Turkey for its future mediation offers in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, especially its referent power vis-à-vis Armenia, which is deemed to be the 
most important form of power in this thesis (see below).  
As we have already seen in the discussion chapter, Turkey does not have the reward 
and coercive power over Armenia. To overcome this, Turkey should open its border with and 
lift its trade embargo on Armenia. Opening the border with and lifting the trade embargo on 
Armenia will serve the interests of Armenia and Turkey both economically and politically, 
though the former will have more positive outcomes than the latter (Giragosian, 2009, p. 4). 
However, Turkey will gain certain advantages as well because following such a policy, while 
there will be a new trade route to be utilised by Turkey, Turkey will also add to its reward, 
and coercive thereof, power vis-à-vis Armenia. This is because when Turkey opens the 
border, it will reward Armenia which is going through a difficult economic phase with new 
economic prospects, and the threat of closing the border again will have a coercive impact 
on Armenia which will not be willing to return to its isolation. Additionally, Turkey should 
also initiate a comprehensive reconciliation with Armenia to ease the tensions between the 
societies of the two states so that Turkey would be readier to reward Armenia which is seen 
by an enemy by many Turks right now. The important point here is that such a reconciliation 
should include Azerbaijan as well. 
As the latest round of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia revealed, getting 
too close to Armenia at the expense of Azerbaijan is not a reliable policy option for Turkey 
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(see Göksel, 2011, p. 6). However, this does not necessarily mean that as Azerbaijan is one 
of the major allies of Turkey, Turkey should forsake the prospects of developing its relations 
with the foes of Azerbaijan. It means that Turkey, while trying to improve its relations with 
Armenia, should include Azeris as well because by doing so, Turkey will reveal that it is 
intent on ushering in a positive environment full of improving relations between the former 
foes, which will serve the purposes of decreasing the tension in the region, creating further 
potential for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and reinforcing the referent 
power of Turkey vis-à-vis both conflicting parties (see Harutinian, 2010). This is the only 
way for Turkey to improve its relations with Armenia without deteriorating its relations with 
Azerbaijan. For example, the fate that Turkey experienced during the Turkish-Armenian 
rapprochement occurred to a certain extent due to the lack of Azeri involvement. Hence, 
rather than conducting bilateral projects with either side, Turkey should opt for (at least) 
trilateral projects or a trilateral rapprochement involving Turkey and the two disputants. 
However, the more regional actors are involved, the better results the projects will bring 
about. Here, Russia comes to the picture.  
To illustrate the web of relations in the South Caucasus and the role Russia can play in 
this web, we can think of a hypothetical situation. While developing its relations with 
Armenia, Turkey will also develop its relations with Russia as Yerevan is Moscow’s main 
ally in the South Caucasus. In other words, since Russia will not allow anything that will 
reduce its presence and gains in the South Caucasus, especially thanks to its control over 
Armenia, any development in Turkish-Armenian relations will be subjected to Russian 
scrutiny. The positive outcome of this is that Turkey and Armenian relations will be better 
off in line with the improvements of Russian-Turkish relations. An improvement in Russian-
Turkish relations will be useful for Turkey as it will increase Ankara’s leverage over Baku 
as well.  
For instance, the decisions in the field of energy taken by Baku during the Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement negatively affected Turkish aspiration of being an energy hub 
country and led to the failure of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, and hence a reduction in 
Turkey’s resourcefulness as a potential mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Following the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, as we have seen in the previous chapters, 
Baku tilted more towards Moscow in formulating its energy policies, bringing about ‘a new 
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political vacuum in the region, that Russia has successfully filled’ (Mikhelidze, 2010, p. 5) 
and endangering the projects like Nabucco and the Turkish demand for being an energy hub. 
However, Russia skilfully manipulated this, and offered Turkey the Turkish Stream project 
which undermined the need for projects between Turkey (and the West) and Azerbaijan. This 
project is crucial because with hindsight, if Turkey had had a better leverage in the field of 
energy than the one possessed by Azerbaijan during the rapprochement, which would be 
possible through the Turkish Stream project, then the decision taken by Azerbaijan would 
not have been that effective. Therefore, if Turkey develops its ties with Armenia and hence 
Russia, it will gain another leverage over Azerbaijan, which can be quite useful in conducting 
successful mediation campaigns, and in helping Turkey develop its relations with its 
neighbours through a multi-fold approach advocated above. 
Therefore, for Turkey, Russia, from a policy-recommendation perspective, stands out 
as the major actor in the South Caucasus. As a regional power, no state can ignore its interests 
which should be taken into account if a peace process on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gets 
initiated (Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 44). Russia is not as constrained in its policies as Turkey is 
in the South Caucasus, which enables Russia to act on its own, something Turkey cannot 
enjoy (Hedenskog and Korkmaz, 2016, p. 3). Therefore, if Turkey, rather than acting on its 
own, offers its mediation to be co-led by Russia, then a more successful mediation can surface 
and be concluded.  
Although, as illustrated by this thesis, Russia is able to mediate the conflict on its own, 
the inclusion of Turkey will serve the interests of Russia and the disputants because it will 
bring in a new perspective and new prospects for future for the disputants and the region in 
general. Therefore, the calls for more Turkish involvement in the peace process in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict coming from Sergei Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation, are quite significant here (see Shirinov, 2016, para 1). Such an 
inclusion in the peace process will be useful for Turkey as well because this will enable 
Turkey to gain an in-depth and first-hand knowledge about the conflicting parties, the conflict 
and the current level of relations between the conflicting parties which will increase the 
expert and informational powers of Turkey.  
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It is known that Russia is selling arms to both disputants (Abrahamyan, 2016, para 1). 
Because of this lucrative business and other economic and political interests, such as the fact 
that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict provides Russia with a strong leverage over the region 
and the disputants (Giragosian, 2017, para 17), Russia is not willing to resolve the conflict. 
Additionally, ‘[t]he Karabakh conflict guarantees Russia’s military presence in the region’ 
(Abushov, 2009, p. 209) and it ‘has also become an instrument in Russia’s hands to maintain 
a situation of “stable instability” in the South Caucasus by exploiting the conflict parties’ 
political and economic weaknesses’ (Mikhelidze, 2010, p. 2). Therefore, based on its 
articulated interests in the South Caucasus, it can be stated that ‘if any power or force which 
one way or another tries to remove Russia from political and geopolitical arena, it will be 
faced with Russia’s resistance and response’ (Arynbek, 2016, p. 470). However, Turkish 
involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through mediation will not undermine the 
interests of Russia. This is mostly because Turkey wants to ‘cooperate rather than compete 
with other mediators’ in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Gamaghelyan, 2010, p. 44). 
To feed this cooperative approach, Turkey should also engage in more projects that 
will prioritise cooperation and peace. In the initial year of independence of Armenia, Turkey 
invited the country to the Black Sea Cooperation Organisation although Armenia is not a 
coastal state (Aras and Özbay, 2008, p. 2). Similarly, following the Five-Day War, the then 
Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, offered the establishment of ‘the Platform 
of Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus’ which was welcomed by the states in the South 
Caucasus along with Russia (Ibrahimov, 2011, p. 17). Such moves will increase the 
credibility of Turkey in the eyes of the South Caucasian states as a prospective mediator 
because they will reveal that Turkey values cooperation, feeding reward power – in the sense 
of rewarding peace, and relationships, consolidating referent power. In short, from a policy 
wise perspective, Turkey should revise its policies towards the region, the disputants and 
other regional actors, especially Russia, for the aim of increasing its leverage over the 
disputants not for being perceived as an unbiased, neutral and impartial power.  
The findings of this thesis have theoretical implications as well that will be useful in 
the scholarship on international mediation. Through a case study, the findings of this thesis, 
especially that of the discussion chapter, support those scholars who claim that possessing 
leverages rather than being unbiased, impartial and neutral is more important in conducting 
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a successful mediation. As this thesis rests on certain theoretical foundations, it has 
arguments for and against along with contributions to such theoretical arguments. 
This thesis also contributes to the discussion on success in international mediation. 
What the thesis proposes is that, in line with the arguments of Touval (2003), since mediation 
is not just a conflict resolution method but also a foreign policy tool, considerations for 
success will be different in both cases. Whereas success will be determined by the level of 
conflict in the first scenario following the mediation process, it will be determined by whether 
the mediator has been able to achieve its foreign policy objective through mediation. In other 
words, there will be two separate post-mediation environments. However, for both 
approaches to mediation, a mediator should be accepted by both disputants. Although this 
seems self-evident and obvious, the author of this thesis contends that acceptance of 
mediation offers should be seen as an aspect of mediation success. This is because, as it has 
been argued in this study, acceptance of mediation offers is strictly related to the acceptability 
of mediators themselves, and the acceptability of mediators depends on the characteristics of 
them, resourcefulness versus neutrality/impartiality/lack of bias. As a result, the thesis offers 
a two-pillar approach to success in international mediation: the first pillar is the acceptance 
of international mediation offers, and the second pillar is the evaluation of the post-mediation 
environment that will depend on the way mediation is utilised.  
While analysing the idea of leverage, the author relied on the ‘six bases of power’ 
concept of Rubin (1992). What the author has found out is that, taking into account both the 
case in this thesis, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the international system in general, 
the legitimate power is not so well-observed in international mediation and is relied on least 
by mediators. This is because (1) states prefer acting on their own, especially those like 
Russia, and (2) if they do not want to act alone, states make references, albeit weak or 
trivially, to the mandate of international law to increase their legitimacy. Therefore, since the 
idea of legitimate power is somehow a given for each mediator, the author of this thesis 
argues that the ‘six bases of power’ concept of Rubin (1992) can easily be reformulated as 
the “five-power” concept in international mediation.  
The other contribution of this thesis to the ‘six bases of power’ concept is providing a 
ranking for it. Based on the analysis conducted here, the author of this thesis claims that these 
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six different categories of power can be ranked, from the most important to the least important 
and with regards to the characteristics of protracted international conflicts an example of 
which is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as follows: referent power, coercive power, reward 
power, expert-informational power, legitimate power. Since mediation, at its core, is an 
extension of the bilateral relations between disputants deteriorated by their conflict, one of 
its core concepts is relationship. Additionally, as the final decision to accept or reject a 
mediation offers falls on the disputants in a conflict, they should be able to think about the 
existing web of relations between them and the interested mediator. As the referent power 
rests on this assumption, it should be seen as the most important power. Moreover, the author 
of this thesis, through a literal approach to referent power, also included the idea of ‘referring 
disputants to mediation’, what is mostly known in the field as delivery, making the 
importance of referent power clearer.  
In today’s international system, I do believe, coercion works better than rewards. 
Therefore, the coercive power comes before the reward power in mediation. The use of 
coercion, or a more ‘manipulative’ approach to mediation, works better especially when the 
conflicts are highly protracted (see Salmon et al., 2013), just like the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict is. The expert and informational powers are quite crucial, but they tend to be 
supporting side powers rather than the most significant ones. The legitimate power comes 
the last because of the reasons outlined above. However, this list is a subjective and 
inconclusive one open to further debate. The important point here is that each item in the list 
contributes to the leverage of any mediator which can then be used to conduct successful 
mediations. 
There are certain weaknesses of this study that I should discuss before concluding the 
thesis. This thesis rests on a qualitative analysis of Turkish and Russian mediation attempts 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and is restricted to the conflict. Therefore, the results, as 
stated above, are not conclusive and cannot be generalised. To do so, a quantitative analysis 
relying on the criteria used in this thesis, should be carried out. Another suggestion for further 
studies is to conduct a comparative analysis of Turkish mediation attempts in each case in 
which Turkey revealed an interest to mediate. 
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